



SCRUTINY BOARD (CITY DEVELOPMENT)

Meeting to be held in Civic Hall, Leeds, LS1 1UR on
Wednesday, 23rd November, 2016 at 10.30 am

(A pre-meeting will take place for ALL Members of the Board at 10.00 a.m.)

MEMBERSHIP

Councillors

- D Cohen - Alwoodley;
- P Davey - City and Hunslet;
- G Latty - Guiseley and Rawdon;
- S Lay - Otley and Yeadon;
- A Ogilvie - Beeston and Holbeck;
- D Ragan - Burmantofts and Richmond Hill;
- E Taylor - Chapel Allerton;
- C Towler - Hyde Park and Woodhouse;
- P Truswell (Chair) - Middleton Park;
- P Wadsworth - Guiseley and Rawdon;
- J Walker - Cross Gates and Whinmoor;

Please note: Certain or all items on this agenda may be recorded

Principal Scrutiny Adviser:
Sandra Pentelow
Tel: 24 74792

Produced on Recycled Paper

A G E N D A

Item No	Ward/Equal Opportunities	Item Not Open		Page No
1			<p>APPEALS AGAINST REFUSAL OF INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS</p> <p>To consider any appeals in accordance with Procedure Rule 25* of the Access to Information Procedure Rules (in the event of an Appeal the press and public will be excluded).</p> <p>(* In accordance with Procedure Rule 25, notice of an appeal must be received in writing by the Head of Governance Services at least 24 hours before the meeting).</p>	
2			<p>EXEMPT INFORMATION - POSSIBLE EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS AND PUBLIC</p> <p>1 To highlight reports or appendices which officers have identified as containing exempt information, and where officers consider that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information, for the reasons outlined in the report.</p> <p>2 To consider whether or not to accept the officers recommendation in respect of the above information.</p> <p>3 If so, to formally pass the following resolution:-</p> <p>RESOLVED – That the press and public be excluded from the meeting during consideration of the following parts of the agenda designated as containing exempt information on the grounds that it is likely, in view of the nature of the business to be transacted or the nature of the proceedings, that if members of the press and public were present there would be disclosure to them of exempt information, as follows:</p> <p>No exempt items have been identified.</p>	

Item No	Ward/Equal Opportunities	Item Not Open		Page No
3			<p>LATE ITEMS</p> <p>To identify items which have been admitted to the agenda by the Chair for consideration.</p> <p>(The special circumstances shall be specified in the minutes.)</p>	
4			<p>DECLARATION OF DISCLOSABLE PECUNIARY INTERESTS</p> <p>To disclose or draw attention to any disclosable pecuniary interests for the purposes of Section 31 of the Localism Act 2011 and paragraphs 13-16 of the Members' Code of Conduct.</p>	
5			<p>APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE AND NOTIFICATION OF SUBSTITUTES</p> <p>To receive any apologies for absence and notification of substitutes.</p>	
6			<p>MINUTES - 12 OCTOBER 2016</p> <p>To confirm as a correct record, the minutes of the meeting held on 12 October 2016.</p>	1 - 6
7			<p>SCRUTINY INQUIRY SESSION - TRANSPORT FOR LEEDS - SUPERTRAM, NGT AND BEYOND</p> <p>To received and consider the report of the Head of Governance Services and Scrutiny Support and appended report of the Director of City Development and West Yorkshire Combined Authority which supports the next session of the Scrutiny Inquiry.</p>	7 - 80
8			<p>WORK SCHEDULE</p> <p>To agree the Board's work schedule for the remainder of the 2016/17 municipal year.</p>	81 - 100

Item No	Ward/Equal Opportunities	Item Not Open		Page No
9			<p>DATE AND TIME OF NEXT MEETING</p> <p>Wednesday 21 December 2016 at 10:30am (pre-meeting for all Board Members at 10:00am)</p> <p>THIRD PARTY RECORDING</p> <p>Recording of this meeting is allowed to enable those not present to see or hear the proceedings either as they take place (or later) and to enable the reporting of those proceedings. A copy of the recording protocol is available from the contacts on the front of this agenda.</p> <p>Use of Recordings by Third Parties – code of practice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Any published recording should be accompanied by a statement of when and where the recording was made, the context of the discussion that took place, and a clear identification of the main speakers and their role or title. b) Those making recordings must not edit the recording in a way that could lead to misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the proceedings or comments made by attendees. In particular there should be no internal editing of published extracts; recordings may start at any point and end at any point but the material between those points must be complete. 	

SCRUTINY BOARD (CITY DEVELOPMENT)

WEDNESDAY, 12TH OCTOBER, 2016

PRESENT: Councillor P Truswell in the Chair

Councillors C Dobson, R Grahame,
G Latty, S Lay, A Ogilvie, D Ragan,
E Taylor, C Towler, P Wadsworth and
Wilkinson

25 Declaration of Disclosable Pecuniary Interests

There were no disclosable pecuniary interests declared at the meeting.

26 Apologies for Absence and Notification of Substitutes

Apologies for absence were submitted by Cllr D Cohen, Cllr P Davey and Cllr J Walker. Cllr D Cohen was substituted by Cllr G Wilkinson, Cllr P Davey was substituted by Cllr R Grahame and Cllr J Walker was substituted by Cllr C Dobson.

27 Minutes - 7 September 2016

RESOLVED – That the minutes of the meeting held on the 7th September 2016 be approved as a correct record.

28 Road Casualty Reduction and Initiatives

The Director of City Development submitted a report which provided the Scrutiny Board with an overview of the progress made with regard to Leeds Killed or Seriously Injured (KSI) Road Casualty Reduction programmes. Updates on road safety initiatives, including road safety schemes, education and promotion campaigns were also provided.

The following information was appended to the report:

- Appendix 1 – Road Safety Action Plan Update 2016

The following representatives were in attendance to respond to Members queries and comments:

- Andrew Hall – Head of Transportation (City Development)
- Becky James – Team Leader, Road Safety
- Chief Inspector Mark Jessop – Protective Services, West Yorkshire Police
- Inspector Nick Berry – Safer Leeds, West Yorkshire Police
- Cllr Richard Lewis - Executive Board Member, Regeneration Transport and Planning

The key areas for discussion were:

- The impact of the comprehensive spending review on road safety. The Board was advised that this has necessitated a change in the way that road policing is provided. Protective Services have upskilled existing officers so that they are roads policing qualified therefore working smarter with the units available. All officers including PCSO's are involved in neighbourhood and traffic policing in varying degrees.
- The funding invested since April 2015 through an initiative called Viper Plus. There will be additional investment in ANPR and additional officers, with who will have traffic skills from April 2017.
- The use of pro laser speed gun technology and the operation of static speed cameras. The Board were advised that pro laser is being used effectively and can read speed over a considerable distance. It records the speed at that moment rather than average speed. A replacement programme of static speed cameras is being undertaken where cameras are being replaced with digital technology.
- Police focus on drivers under the influence of drink or drugs.
- Concern regarding drivers still using mobiles despite the introduction of increased penalties. The Board was advised of an initiative in Bradford, the potential to use police staff and invest in new technology to enforce traffic law, that car design is removing the need for handset use and the need for a cultural change through education, enforcement and social intervention.
- Concerns regarding the safety of cyclists due to the increase in activity in the city. The Board was advised of risk reduction through highways design, the education of cyclists and drivers, and the lessons that have been learned in London that could be applied in Leeds. Cycling training is not part of the school curriculum however cycling training is provided in schools in Leeds, usually in years 5 or 6.
- Cycle superhighway information production and distribution. The Board was advised of the range of provision for cyclists including advisory cycling lanes. On the A65 and A60 there are promotional initiatives to encourage drivers to take special care when turning.
- The responsibility of the Highways Authority for highways design, which includes an interactive process with the police and other emergency services in planning processes. The Board was advised that where there have been serious incidents there is analysis of what happened to identify any issues with the highways design.
- The collection of intelligence and data regarding casualties which enables the identification of risk locations.
- The role and co-ordination of Neighbourhood Policing Teams in dealing with local speeding issues.
- The risks to pedestrians due to parking on the pavement. CI Jessop suggested that there may be an opportunity for analysis of inconsiderate parking as a causation factor. The Board requested that this information be provided. In addition the Board was advised that pedestrian training is provided to children in school.

- Clarification regarding access to the minutes for the Executive Regional Partnership, Gary Bartlett represents from Leeds City Council.
- The use of Speed Indicating Devices which are loaned out to community groups or Neighbourhood Policing Teams.
- The Board requested additional information regarding lengths and sites for concern and the current 20mph zones.
- Cl Jessop invited members of the board to visit the ANPR unit to see it in operation.

RESOLVED – The Scrutiny Board:

- a) noted the information in the report of the Director of City Development.
- b) requested additional information referred to in this minute to be circulated to all members of the Scrutiny Board (City Development)

29 Inquiry into Bus Service Provision - Final Session

West Yorkshire Combined Authority submitted a report which provided the Scrutiny Board with an update on the ongoing Bus Strategy consultation and provided the opportunity for the Board to provide a response. The report also provided an outline of the Buses Bill and the opportunities this could introduce once enacted.

The following information was appended to the report:

- Appendix 1 – West Yorkshire Transport Strategy Summary
- Appendix 2 – West Yorkshire Bus Strategy Summary
- Appendix 3 – The Bus Services Bill and Overview, Department of Transport
- Appendix 4 – Letter from WYCA Transport Committee to MP's regarding the Bus Services Bill
- Appendix 5 – Local Government Association briefing note on Bus Services Bill
- Appendix 6 – UTG response to the Transport Select Committee

The following representatives were in attendance to respond to Members queries and comments:

- Andrew Hall – Head of Transportation (City Development)
- Tom Gifford – Project Manager, WYCA
- Dave Pearson – Director of Transport Services, WYCA
- Cllr Richard Lewis - Executive Board Member, Regeneration Transport and Planning

The key areas for discussion were:

- The involvement of operators in the West Yorkshire Bus Strategy. This was progressed regardless of the Bus Bill to enable focus on issues that can be addressed with bus operators in a collaborative way.
- Day to day bus service issues. The Board were advised that WYCA work with bus operators and Highways, looking at the corridors and routes that have the biggest problems with regard to punctuality and reliability. The Board was also advised of the work done to reduce congestion due to road works.
- Consultation update and the demographic make-up of responses. The Board sought clarity on how young people are being engaged in the consultation. In response to the consultation the Board expressed their concerns about bus reliability, the lack of sanctions for bus companies and affordability due to the consistent rise in bus fares.
- Fare structures for children and young people and the gradual decrease in patronage.
- The ability of the community to influence commercial bus routes and the subsidised services commissioned by WYCA.
- Appendix 4, Letter from the Combined Authority to all Leeds City Region Members of Parliament. The Board sought clarity regarding any response from the MP's to the concerns regarding franchising powers in the Bus Services Bill and the addition of requirements or tests which could render the legislation useless. It was confirmed that no response had been received. The Board acknowledged that further lobbying may be needed as the Bill in its current draft leaves the decision regarding franchising for authorities without an elected mayor to the secretary of state. This is a concern for a number of authorities not just West Yorkshire. The Scrutiny Board resolved to endorse the points made in appendix 4 and to support this by writing to MP's.
- Bus technologies and the need for greater investment in cleaner technologies.

RESOLVED – The Scrutiny Board:

- c) noted the information in the report of the West Yorkshire Combined Authority, including the progress of the ongoing consultation with members of the public and stakeholders on the West Yorkshire Bus Strategy.
- d) Provided consultation feedback regarding bus reliability, the lack of sanctions for bus companies and affordability.
- e) Endorsed the points made by the West Yorkshire Combined Authority Transport Committee in their letter detailed as appendix 4. The Scrutiny Board will also write to MP's regarding the restrictive draft legislation relating to franchising.

30 Work Schedule

A report was submitted by the Head of Governance Services and Scrutiny Support which detailed the Scrutiny Board's draft work programme for the current municipal year.

The draft Scrutiny Board (City Development) work schedule for 2016/2017 and the Executive Board minutes for 21 September 2016 were appended to the report.

RESOLVED - The Scrutiny Board noted the content of the report and agreed the work program.

31 Date and Time of Next Meeting

Wednesday, 23 November 2016 at 10:30am (pre-meeting for all Board Members at 10:00am)

The meeting concluded at 12:55pm

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Report author: Sandra Pentelow
Tel: 0113 2474792

Report of the Head of Governance Services and Scrutiny Support

Report to Scrutiny Board (City Development)

Date: 23 November 2016

Subject: Transport for Leeds - Supertram, NGT and Beyond

Are specific electoral Wards affected? If relevant, name(s) of Ward(s):	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Are there implications for equality and diversity and cohesion and integration?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Is the decision eligible for Call-In?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Does the report contain confidential or exempt information? If relevant, Access to Information Procedure Rule number: Appendix number:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No

1. Summary of Main Issues

At its meeting on the 15th of June 2016, the Scrutiny Board considered a request for Scrutiny from Cllr Judith Blake, Leader of Leeds City Council, which asked for consideration of the role of the Council, the West Yorkshire Combined Authority/METRO and the city’s public transport operators in relation to the decisions for both NGT and Supertram.

Terms of reference for this inquiry were agreed by the Scrutiny Board at the September 2016 when it was determined that the purpose of the inquiry is to make an assessment of and, where appropriate, make recommendations on the following areas:

- To identify strengths and weaknesses of the Supertram and NGT schemes, what lessons can be learnt, and how learning can be applied to future transport schemes and projects.
- The developing transport strategy, short, medium and long terms options, maximising beneficial impact, and how options could be financed, planned and delivered.
- Meeting the needs and aspirations of communities and stakeholders through engagement and involvement in the shaping and delivery of transport schemes and projects.

2 Inquiry Session November 2016

The Director of City Development and West Yorkshire Combined Authority has prepared a report which responds to requests for further information made by the Board at the September meeting. The report also presents an update on the Leeds Transport Summit and Conversation on Leeds Transport Strategy.

Representatives have also been invited to the meeting to contribute to the inquiry, they are:

- Peter Bonsall, Emeritus Professor of Transport Planning at the University of Leeds
- Bill McKinnon , Vice Chairman of the A660 Joint Council
- Chris Longley, Area Policy Representative, Yorkshire Federation of Small Businesses

All representatives were invited to make a written submission, which are included in this agenda as appendix G and H. All representatives were advised that the Board would not be revisiting submissions to the public inquiry and that the Board wish to understand:

- **their views on what lessons can be learned and applied for future transport provision.**
- **their views on local community engagement and consultation in the future.**
- **the future transport solution(s)/options that they consider might work in Leeds.**

3. Recommendation

The Scrutiny Board (City Development) is recommended to:

- a) Note the information contained within the report of the Director of City Development and WYCA.
- b) Note the written and verbal information provided by the visiting representatives.

Report of Director of City Development and WYCA

Report to Scrutiny Board (City Development)

Date: 23rd November 2016

Subject: Inquiry into the Development of NGT

Are specific electoral Wards affected? If relevant, name(s) of Ward(s):	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Are there implications for equality and diversity and cohesion and integration?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Is the decision eligible for Call-In?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Does the report contain confidential or exempt information? If relevant, Access to Information Procedure Rule number: Appendix number:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No

Summary of main issues

1. The Leader of the Council has formally requested Scrutiny Board to “consider undertaking a Scrutiny Inquiry into the role of the Council, the West Yorkshire Combined Authority(WYCA)/METRO and the city’s public transport operators in relation to the decisions for both NGT and Supertram.”
2. The Inquiry will consider the development of both projects and what lessons can be learned to inform future decisions on major transport projects in the City
3. Detailed background information was provided at the July and September Scrutiny meetings. This report provides further background and additional information requested at these meetings.
4. The Council is currently undertaking a city-wide “Conversation” on the future of transport in Leeds to develop a future transport strategy for the city.

Recommendations

1. Members are requested to note and comment on this report.

1. Purpose of this report

- 1.1 This report provides Members with background information on the development of the Supertram and NGT projects. It also provides an update on the new Transport Strategy emerging from the Transport Summit held on 10th June and the ongoing city wide Conversation on Transport.

2. Background information

- 2.1 Leeds Supertram formed a key element of the 1991 Leeds Transport Strategy. The Department for Transport (DfT) granted full network approval in March 2001, but in November 2005 the project was cancelled by the DfT on the grounds of affordability.
- 2.4 A high quality bus alternative to Supertram was subsequently developed by the Promoters, Leeds and Metro in conjunction with the DfT. This was to become a Trolley Bus proposal known as New Generation Transport (NGT) which gained Programme Entry Approval from the DfT in 2010 and again in 2012.
- 2.5 Following a public inquiry into NGT held in 2014 the DfT announced on the 12th May 2016 that the Transport and Works Act Order (TWAO) application had not been granted. However in an unprecedented announcement the DfT did still award the £173.5m allocated to Leeds for public transport projects in the City.
- 2.6 More detailed background information was given in the July and September 2016 Scrutiny reports.

3 Main Issues

3.1 Leeds Transport Summit / Conversation on Leeds Transport Strategy

- 3.1.1 Leeds City Council, in partnership with WYCA, are developing a longer term strategic approach to transport in the city through a conversation initiated by the Transport Summit. The first phase of which is focused on securing the promised £173.5m from the Government. Progression of the Transport Conversation and Transport Strategy spend is to be reported to Executive Board on the 14th December, with a subsequent DfT submission before Christmas. This first phase will sit within a wider context of the £1 billion of transport schemes identified through the Transport Fund and the development of a longer term strategy for Leeds next year.
- 3.1.2 The on-line survey bit.ly/TransportLeeds closed on the 11th November with over 7,500 responses. Leeds and the West Yorkshire Combined Authority (WYCA) have developed a child friendly questionnaire for distribution through the Child Friendly networks. The deadline was the 21st October.
- 3.1.3 The online survey has continued to be promoted including through a city wide circulation of the postcards to all households (352,000) in Leeds. Paper copies have been made available at One Stop Centres and Community Hubs along with copies being sent directly to access group members without online access.

Copies are also being made available at community meetings and workshops, with freepost envelopes.

- 3.1.4 A wide range of marketing has been employed including advertising on the radio, buses local rail stations, digital screens, social media and press releases. There has been a high level of Facebook activity with over 190,000 'Facebook impressions' on peoples newsfeeds (number of times advert viewed), with over 5,500 click throughs to the web page. Facebook and Twitter have also been used to promote the community events and encourage participation.
- 3.1.5 The Transport Conversation has been taking place concurrently with the West Yorkshire Combined Authorities (WYCA) Transport and Bus strategy consultation. The questionnaire deadline was the 21st October. Consequently there has been the opportunity to work jointly for example at the majority of the 23 Leeds Drop in events for the Bus and Transport Strategy, officers from Highways have attended.
- 3.1.6 Following on from the Transport Summit workshop, two further workshops (15th and 20th September) were attended by a wide range of stakeholders (over 80 attended). Additional workshops and presentations have taken place with key stakeholders for example, the Physical and Sensory Impairment group, the Millennials, Leeds Sustainable Development Group, Youth Forum workshop with youth groups (27th October and 14th Nov) and Older Peoples Forum groups (28th October and 7th November). As well as one to ones with Operators, Business, Special interest User Groups, Access and equality groups (including the BME Hub, Access and Use ability group, Deaf Forum, equalities assembly, LGBT Hub, Women Live Leeds (tbc).
- 3.1.7 For the Community Committees, presentations and workshops have been undertaken at
 - 7 Community Committees to date (from the 5th – 22nd September)
 - 10 Community Committees workshops to be undertaken (6th Sept to 8th November)
 - 5 meetings with Forums and themed groups
- 3.1.8 A Cross Party Members group (chaired by Cllr Wakefield) met on 6th October and the 10th November. The Independent Panel of experts met on October 27th with a further meeting planned for the 24th November. Details of the Panel are given in Appendix A
- 3.1.9 Aecom have been commissioned to provide an independent analysis of the feedback from the questionnaire and conversation. Interim feedback on the consultation to date will be reported through to Executive Board (14th December) and will inform the basis for a strategic case for the DfT.

3.1.10 Next Steps:

- Executive Board report in December followed by the submission of a strategic case for the allocated funds to Government before the end of the year.
- Continuing to build to develop the conversation to focus on the emerging strategy and issues and to develop a longer term strategic prospectus for the city alongside the completion of the new West Yorkshire Transport Strategy next year.
- It is expected that the final prospectus will be reported back to Executive Board during 2017 which will include the final results of the questionnaire and Conversation.

3.2 Experience of Advisors

3.2.1 A number of Advisors were employed to assist in the delivery of NGT. The advisors were selected through a full OJEU procurement process in Summer 2008. The advisors selected had considerable experience and expertise in the delivery, including the TWAO process, of the largest rapid transit schemes in the UK including Manchester Metrolink, Nottingham NET, Blackpool Tramway, Midland Metro and London Tramlink as well as on bus based systems including Leigh (Manchester) and Luton Dunstable. Each of these advisors who are listed below have provided a statement of their expertise (see Appendices as indicated):

- i. Mott MacDonald: Engineering, Operational and Environmental advice and design (Appendix B);
- ii. Steer Davies Gleave (SDG); Developed the Value for Money (Economic Case) and Financial Case for the NGT Business Case (Appendix C);
- iii. Bircham Dyson Bell (BDB): Legal Advice in relation to the promotion of a TWAO (Appendix D);
- iv. Aecom: Development of the Leeds Transport Model to forecast demand for NGT (Appendix E); and
- v. KPMG: Developed the procurement strategy for NGT (Appendix F).

4 Corporate Considerations

4.1 Consultation and Engagement

- 4.1.1 Extensive Consultation was carried out on both Supertram and NGT. In addition to the formal requirements of the TWAO process, consultation and engagement has been carried out on NGT including:
- Feasibility consultation in 2008

- Consultation carried out in 2009/2010 involving 21 days of exhibitions along the route – showed strong support for the proposals.
- Area Committee presentations.
- Briefing to the main political groups September-November 2012
- 26 Public Consultation events held October 2012 - July 2013: over 1,100 attendees
- 52,000 leaflets distributed
- Quarterly E-newsletter with circulation of around 450 people
- Meetings with Businesses, access groups, Tenant organisations, Civic Trust, Cycling Forum and the Universities
- Meetings with Councillors and MPs
- Engagement with officers from across the Council.
- Meetings with affected land and property owners along the route.
- City Plans Panel meetings devoted to the NGT proposals.

4.1.2 The city-wide conversation about the future of transport in Leeds is detailed in Section 3.1 of this report.

4.2 Equality and Diversity / Cohesion and Integration

4.2.1 A full equality impact assessment was undertaken on the Project and accompanied the TWAO application. The assessment concluded by stating that the provision of a new and frequent public transport service in the form of a trolleybus network would improve access to a whole range of social and economic resources along the route including the City Centre, Leeds' two universities, a major hospital, and a whole range of other facilities from shops to places of worship. It also acknowledged however that the construction and implementation phases may have a negative effect on a range of local socio-demographic groups and communities. The report contained a number of recommendations to mitigate the negative impacts.

4.3 Council policies and Best Council Plan

4.3.1 This inquiry will support objectives as defined in The Vision for Leeds 2011 – 2030 and the Best Council Plan 2015-20.

4.4 Resources and value for money

4.4.1 This report has no specific resource and value for money implications

4.5 Legal Implications, Access to Information and Call In

4.5.1 This report has no specific legal or access to information implications

4.6 Risk Management

4.6.1 This report has no risk management implications.

5 Conclusions

- 5.1 The Supertram and NGT proposals were developed over a period of around 25 years. At all stages the Department for Transport were fully engaged and awarded both schemes formal approvals at key stages of their development. Key decisions were taken by DfT throughout the process which led to fundamental changes to the scheme. Several led to adverse comments / criticisms in the Inspector's final report.
- 5.2 During this time period the schemes were supported by the major political parties at both national and local level.
- 5.2 The Department for Transport cancelled both Supertram and after 15 and 10 years respectively had been spent in development.
- 5.3 This report has presented an overview of the background to the development of both Supertram and NGT and explores some of the reasons behind the decision.
- 5.4 The Transport Conversation on the City's Transport Strategy has recently concluded.

6 Recommendations

- 6.1 Members are requested to note and comment on this report.

7 Background documents¹

7.1 Appendices

Appendix A – Membership of the Advisory Panel

Appendix B – Mott Macdonald Statement of Experience and Expertise

Appendix C - SDG Statement of Experience and Expertise

Appendix D - BDB Statement of Experience and Expertise

Appendix E - Aecom Statement of Experience and Expertise

Appendix F – KPMG Statement of Experience and Expertise

¹ The background documents listed in this section are available to download from the Council's website, unless they contain confidential or exempt information. The list of background documents does not include published works.

Appendix A: Leeds Transport Expert Advisory Panel

Membership

Who	Role and Organisation
Nigel Foster (chair)	Director of Strategy, Transport for the North
Ben Still	Managing Director of the West Yorkshire Transport Authority
Prof Greg Marsden	Professor of Transport Governance - Institute for Transport Studies at University of Leeds
Prof David Begg	Various roles
Stephen Joseph	Campaign for Better Transport
David Brown	Chief Executive, Transport for the North
Rob McIntosh	Network Rail, Route Managing Director
Alex Hynes	Managing director of Arriva Rail North Ltd
Geoff Inskip	Centro Chief Executive
Chris Longley	Area Policy Representative, Yorkshire Federation of Small Businesses (FSB)
John Dales	Chair of the Transport Planning Society
Alexandra Jones (Sending Paul Swinney)	Chief Exec Centre for Cities
Xavier Brice	Chief Exec Sustrans
Rashik Parmar	IBM, on the LEP Board
Jagdeep Passan	Chair of the Access and Useability Group, LCC, Chief Executive of Leeds involving People
Mary Naylor	Access Committee for Leeds, Member of Access & Usability Group and equalities hub. Chair of local National Federation of the Blind, Chair of Leeds Involving People, and member of the LTHT working groups.
Stephanie Burras	Chief Executive of Leeds Ahead - a social enterprise that connects businesses and communities to create social and economic change.
Bridget Roswell (Sending Ellie Evans)	Volterra – an economic consultancy who apply cutting edge economic, behavioural and scientific analysis to forge a new perspective on business and public issues.

Steve Yanni

Chief Executive, Transport Systems Catapult

Appendix B

Experience of Mott MacDonald in relation to NGT. The following advice note was produced by Mott MacDonald to demonstrate their relevant experience.

To Andrew Wheeler/ Dave Haskins

From Callum Gibson

Our reference

312694

Revision

A

Date

6th September 2015

Subject

Mott MacDonald experience

Introduction

The purpose of Advice Note is to summarise Mott MacDonald’s experience of specific relevance to our role on scheme development and TWA submission for Leeds NGT. In particular this includes the experience of our key staff on this commission.

Corporate Experience

Mott MacDonald is one of the largest firms of consulting engineers in the UK with a track record extending over 100 years. We are wholly employee owned, with over 6000 staff in the UK and over 16000 staff globally. Our biggest single operating sector is transportation, with over 3000 professional staff from a broad range of related disciplines – economists, environmentalists, transport planners, procurement experts, engineers, project and programme managers, safety specialists, cost consultants, and more.

We have a longstanding proven track record of undertaking similar commissions to Leeds NGT, drawing from experience as the UK’s leading consultant in the feasibility and development of light rapid transit (LRT) schemes from concept through TWA application process and beyond. Uniquely, we operate a specific Rapid Transit practice with strong links among teams across core offices, drawing on appropriate expertise and experience as required for individual commissions and areas of specialist advice. Our expertise in LRT has been recognised across the industry through success at the UK’s LRT Awards for 6 years in a row for Consultant/Supplier of the Year.

We have particular strength in the upfront scheme development and Transport and Works Act (TWA) application stages, with leading roles across most of the UK’s LRT systems including Manchester Metrolink, Nottingham NET, Blackpool Tramway, Midland Metro and London Tramlink as well as on bus based systems including Leigh (Manchester) and Luton Dunstable.

The table below summarises some of our most relevant UK experience where we had the leading technical role:

Scheme	Experience					Comments
	Development	Parliamentary Approval	Planning Approval	TWA Achieved	Design	
Midland Metro – Phase 1 Extension (BCCE)	√			√	√	
Midland Metro – Phase 1 Extension (BCCE); material operation.	√		√		√	√
Midland Metro – Centenary Square (CSQ)	√		√	√	√	
Midland Metro – Eastside Extension	√		√			TWA application in preparation
Midland Metro – Depot Enhancement	√		√		√	
Midland Metro – Black Country Access	√					
Midland Metro – Phase 2 (Varsity North route)	√					
Midland Metro – Phase 2 (Airport route)	√					
Midland Metro – Phase 1 Extension (WBHE); material operations.	√		√		√	√

Scheme	Experience					Comments	
	Development	Parliamentary Approval	Planning Approval	TWA Achieved	Design	Construction	
Nottingham Express Transit (NET) Phase 2; Line 2 (Chilwell)	√			√	√	√	
Nottingham Express Transit (NET) Phase 2; Line 3 (Clifton)	√		√	√	√	√	
Nottingham Express Transit (NET) Line 1 termination							Asset condition
Manchester Metrolink - Phase 3 Airport	√			√			
Manchester Metrolink - Phase 3 Oldham Town Centre	√			√			
Manchester Metrolink - Phase 3 - Oldham Mumps	√			√			Under construction
Manchester Metrolink - Phase 3 - Rochdale	√			√			
Manchester Metrolink - Phase 3 –Queens Road depot expansion	√		√		√		
Manchester Metrolink - Phase 3 -2nd Depot	√			√			
Manchester Metrolink - Phase 3 -2nd city crossing	√			√			
Manchester Metrolink – Trafford Park Extension	√			√			TWA decision awaited
Blackpool tram depot	√		√		√	√	
Blackpool North Extension	√						TWA application submitted
Docklands Light Railway: Station upgrades to accommodate 3 car vehicles	√				√	√	Operational
London Tramlink design framework	√		√		√		Various commissions
Wirral Tramway expansion and integration with Wirral Waters development	√						
Leigh Salford Manchester Bus Rapid Transit	√		√	√			
Luton Dunstable Busway	√		√	√			

Experience of individuals

We summarise below the relevant experience of 3 of our key staff

Callum Gibson – Mott MacDonald Project Director

Callum has extensive expertise in leading engineering and environmental teams for the development of major infrastructure projects, in particular for rapid transit projects. He has considerable experience of stakeholder and public consultation as well as knowledge of infrastructure planning processes including Transport and Works Act (TWA) and Development Consent Orders, including acting as Expert Witness. He is our UK Deputy Practice Leader for LRT, helping coordinate resourcing, training and skills development, and business development across our LRT practice

Particularly relevant project examples include:

- Nottingham NET tramway. Project Manager for development, submission of TWA application and Public Inquiries for 17km extension to Nottingham NET tram system. Complex scheme with significant on-street running, major new structures (including over Nottingham Station) and interface with major stakeholders. Acted as Engineering Expert Witness at Public Inquiry. Provided strategic input to procurement process for design, build maintain and operate concession, and preparation of reference design for concession tendering process. Subsequently Project Director for several commissions considering potential further NET extensions totalling over 50km including to serve HS2 East Midlands Hub. Commissions covered all engineering, traffic and environmental issues.

- Manchester Metrolink extensions. Many roles over 20 years on development and TWA processes for several significant extensions. Most recently, this was as Project Director for our lead engineer commissions for the development, TWA application and Public Inquiry processes for Second City Crossing (new Metrolink route across the heart of Manchester city centre) and Trafford Park Line, and for the lead engineer and environmental adviser roles considering the feasibility of several tram train routes.
- HS2 Phase 2B. Deliver Manager (North) for lead technical adviser role for the initial development of HS2 routes to Leeds. Role included significant option development and appraisal, public and stakeholder consultation, and close liaison with environmental adviser
- Luton Dunstable Busway. Project Manager for the initial feasibility, design development, TWA application and subsequent Public Inquiry for bus rapid transit . Engineering Expert Witness at Public Inquiry
- Extensive experience as consents and approvals expert adviser and peer reviewer across a wide range of major infrastructure projects including LRT, heavy rail and Development Consent Orders including for underground gas storage caverns

Jason Smith – Mott MacDonald Project Manager

Jason has detailed and extensive experience on a range of major infrastructure projects focused on the LRT and transportation sector for over 20 years. This covers all aspects of scheme development and procurement from initial concept to implementation. Typically this has included management of large multi-disciplinary teams including engineering and environmental aspects, as well as managing working relations with the client and other consultants. He has detailed understanding of the planning process including TCPA, DCO and TWAO schemes. Jason is our LRT Practice Leader representative covering Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle offices. He is particularly strong in the management of our teams, evidenced by winning our Project Manager of the Year award for the Mott MacDonald Group in 2013.

Particularly relevant projects include:

- Leeds Station Southern Entrance (LSSE). Project Manager for the design finalisation, TWA and Public Inquiry stage for the new LSSE. Responsible for managing all our engineering, environmental traffic, and land referencing inputs, and for helping the client to ensure that the scheme was well defined, affordable, deliverable and could be robustly defended at public inquiry. Expert Witness at public inquiry
- Nottingham NET tramway. Assistant Project Manager coordinating our team for the initial development, option selection and development to TWA application for 17km extension to the NET system with significant on-street running, stakeholder interfaces, and major civil engineering works
- East Coast Main Line (ECML) Level Crossing Closure Programme – Project manager for work to close 41 level crossings on the ECML including options selection, single option development and TWA Order material stages. Led the development of the technical design in consultation with multiple local authorities, along with managing the liaison with over 300 directly affected parties as well as around 50 stakeholder groups.
- Manchester Metrolink. Various projects and roles including as team leader providing engineering assistance for extensions to the Metrolink LRT (tram) System. Work included design development and refinement, safeguarding of alignment with respect to adjacent developments, and preparation of material for TWA submissions

Kevin Leather – Mott MacDonald Environmental Lead

Kevin is a chartered environmentalist and highly experienced environmental consultant with over 27 years' consultancy experience in environmental impact assessment (EIA), management and auditing for the design and construction of transport, energy, and infrastructure projects. He is a full member of the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment (IEMA), a chartered environmentalist with the Society for the Environment, and a registered Environmental Auditor under the IEMA scheme. Particular projects include:

- High Speed 2. Delivery manager for the delivery of the Supplementary Environmental Statement (SES) and the Additional Provisions for the London Metropolitan/Country South portions of the HS2 route. The role involves risk managing the delivery process focussing on programme, technical guidance, resources and co-ordination of authors and topic teams.

- London (Croydon) Tramlink. Responsible for environmental detailed design elements and obtaining the environmental consents for Croydon Tramlink including one of the first construction Environmental Management Plans (EMP)
- North Doncaster Chord. Led our environmental team considering all sustainability and environmental aspects of a proposed rail flyover north of Doncaster on the East Coast Main Line. This included preparation of the environmental statement and supporting documents for the DCO application.
- Nottingham NET Phase 2. Client environmental advisor for the construction period, advising the promoter Nottingham City Council on the detailed design and construction work

Appendix C

Experience of Steer Davies Gleave (SDG) in relation to NGT. The following advice note was produced by SDG to demonstrate their relevant experience.

Steer Davies Gleave: Selected Rail/Rapid Transit Business Case & Inquiry Experience

Project	Date	Client	Role	Status
Bank Station Upgrade	2014-15	Transport for London	Expert witness on traffic and transportation issues. Objector management advice	TWAO Order granted
Barking Riverside Extension	2015-ongoing	Transport for London	Business case support and planning advice for extension of London Overground. Preparation for TWAO Inquiry	TWAO Order application in preparation
Birmingham Gateway	2005-2010	Network Rail	Economic appraisal and business case support for the redevelopment of Birmingham New Street station	Funding awarded and scheme completed in 2016
Blackpool & Fleetwood Tramway Upgrade	2006-10	Blackpool Council	Business case support for the upgrade of Blackpool Tramway, including new tram fleet and depot plus system wide renewal works	Completed and new fleet introduced in 2011
Blackpool Tramway Extension to Blackpool North	2011-ongoing	Blackpool Council	Option identification, business case and support for TWAO Order application for extension of Blackpool Tramway from North Pier to Blackpool North railway station	TWAO Order application has been made
Cambridgeshire Guided Busway	2001-05	Cambridgeshire County Council	Project managers of the Cambridgeshire Guided Busway) scheme from feasibility to obtaining a TWAO and funding approval from DfT	Scheme opened in 2011
Croxley Rail Link	2006-15	Hertfordshire County Council	Business case support and planning advice for extension of LUL Metropolitan Line in Watford. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry. Post-inquiry funding advice	TWAO granted in 2013. Funding package agreed in 2015
Ebbw Valley Railway	1999-2003	Capita/Gwent Consultancy	Demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case development which secured Welsh Assembly Government funding for the reopening of the railway and introduction of a service to Cardiff	Scheme opened in 2008
Edinburgh Tram	2005 - ongoing	City of Edinburgh Council	Demand forecasting, economic and appraisal of Edinburgh Tram and proposed extensions. Assistance to CEC when re-specifying the project to address cost overruns. On-going work on future extensions	First phase scheme opened May 2014
Leeds NGT	2007-2016	WYPTE/WYCA	Demand forecasting (to 2010), economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry	Scheme cancelled in 2016 following rejection of TWAO application
Leeds Station Southern Entrance	2011-2013	WYPTE	Economic appraisal and business case advice. Prepared evidence for TWAO Inquiry. Post-inquiry funding advice	Scheme opened in 2016

Project	Date	Client	Role	Status
Leeds Supertram Line 1	1990-96	WYPTE	Option identification, demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at Private Bill Committee. Post Bill funding case support	Private Bill enacted in 1993
Leeds Supertram Lines 2 & 3	1994-97	WYPTE	Option identification, demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry. Post inquiry funding case support	TWAO granted in 2001
Leeds Supertram Business Case	1997-2005	WYPTE	Business case support for implementation of three-line Leeds Supertram project	Scheme cancelled in 2005 following withdrawal of Government funding support
Leigh Salford Manchester Quality Bus Corridor	1998-2012	GMPTE	Option identification, demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry. Post inquiry business case advice and funding case support	Scheme opened May 2016
Luton Dunstable Guided Busway	1999-2007	Luton Borough Council	Option identification, demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry. Post inquiry business case advice and funding case support	Scheme opened September 2013
Manchester Metrolink Airport Extension	1994-2011	GMPTE	Option identification, demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry. Post inquiry business case advice and funding case support	Scheme opened November 2014
Manchester Metrolink Ashton-under-Lyne Extension	1994-2011	GMPTE	Option identification, demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry. Post inquiry business case advice and funding case support	Scheme fully opened October 2013
Manchester Metrolink East Didsbury Extension	2008-2011	GMPTE	Demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice	Scheme fully opened May 2013
Manchester Metrolink Oldham-Rochdale Extension	1995-2010	GMPTE	Demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice	Scheme fully opened in 2013
Manchester Metrolink Second City Crossing	2010 - 2013	TfGM	Economic appraisal and business case advice. Prepared evidence for TWAO Inquiry. Post inquiry business case and funding case support	TWAO Order granted. Scheme under construction
Manchester Metrolink Trafford Park Line	2013 - ongoing	TfGM	Economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry. Post inquiry business case and funding support	TWAO Inquiry held 2015. Outcome awaited

Project	Date	Client	Role	Status
Merseyside Rapid Transit	1997-1999	Merseytravel	Option identification, preliminary design, demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry	TWAO Inquiry held 1998. Order not granted
Merseytram	1995-2005	Merseytravel	Option identification, preliminary design, demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry. Post inquiry business case support.	TWAO Order granted for Line. Scheme cancelled following withdrawal of Government funding support
Midland Metro Extension to New Street & New Tram Fleet	2008 - 2012	WMPTE (Centro)	Business case for extension to New Street using pre-existing TWAO powers and for new fleet	New fleet entered service in Jan 2014. Extension opened in June 2016.
Midland Metro Centenary Square Extension	2013-2015	WMPTE (Centro)	Business case and expert witness at TWAO inquiry	Order granted in May 2016. Construction expected to start in 2017
Midland Metro Eastside Extension	2012 - ongoing	WMPTE (Centro)	Business case development, preparation for TWAO inquiry anticipated for 2017	Work ongoing
Midland Metro Edgbaston Extension	2014 - ongoing	WMPTE (Centro)	Business case for extension using pre-existing TWAO powers	Funding decision awaited
Midland Metro Wolverhampton City Centre Extension	2013-2015	WMPTE (Centro)	Business case and expert witness at TWAO inquiry	Order granted in June 2016
Northern Line Extension	2008-ongoing	TfL/Battersea Power Station	Concept development, preliminary feasibility study, business case development, lead transport advisor, expert witness at TWAO inquiry staff secondment to TfL to manage the transport case and TWAO processes	TWAO granted in 2014 and scheme now under construction
Shortlands Junction	1998-1999	Railtrack	Transport case for TWAO application	TWAO granted and scheme opened in 2003
South Hampshire Rapid Transit	1994-2005	Hampshire County Council	Option identification, preliminary design, demand forecasting, economic appraisal and business case advice. Expert witness at TWAO Inquiry. Post inquiry business case support	TWAO Order granted for Line. Scheme cancelled in 2005 following withdrawal of Government funding support

Project	Date	Client	Role	Status
Thameslink	1998-2008	Railtrack/DfT	Business case and economic appraisal. Expert witness at TWAO inquiry. Post inquiry business case support	TWAOs granted and scheme is under phased construction
Tyne & Wear Metro Project Orpheus	2002-2010	TWPTE (Nexus)	Business case and economic appraisal for upgrade and refurbishment of Tyne & Wear Metro	Funding awarded and upgrade close to completion
Tyne & Wear Metro Sunderland Extension	1992-1998	TWPTE (Nexus)	Business case and economic appraisal. Expert witness at TWAO inquiry. Post inquiry business case and funding support	TWAO granted and scheme opened in 2002
West of England Rapid Transit	2006-2016	Bristol City Council	Option identification and feasibility studies, option assessment, leading planning application process (TWAO, DCO, TCPA), advise on funding and delivery issues, procurement advice	Phased implementation is underway

Appendix D

Experience of Bircham Dyson Bell (BDB) in relation to NGT. The following advice note was produced by BDB to demonstrate their relevant experience.

BDB EXPERIENCE OF SIMILAR PROJECTS

1 We were instructed to act on NGT in 2008, following a competitive tender between all of the UK law firms with experience of promoting urban transit infrastructure. As requested, we provided as part of that tender details of three major UK projects, relevant to NGT. The projects we chose were:

1.1 Cambridgeshire Guided Busway

The Cambridgeshire Guided Busway (CGB), as the prime example of a guided busway system successfully taken through the TWA Order system and which was then in the process of being built. It gave rise to a great many issues, experience of which helped to inform the proposed NGT promotion.

1.2 Nottingham Express Transit (NET) Phase Two

NET Phase Two was a live example of the kind of issues the Promoters were likely to face on NGT. Elements that we would particularly highlight are that it is or has involved, over 1,000 objectors, a joint TWA Order promotion, numerous planning, heritage, environmental, open space, rights of way and property issues, including exchange land certificate and listed building/conservation area consent applications, accesses new Park & Ride sites; and complicated TWA Order drafting.

1.3 Merseytram

Whilst Merseytram Line 1 was not then being built, the promotion of the TWA Order in a record time and the issues it raised were still relatively recent. It involved 286 TWA Order objections, major objections raised by Liverpool City Council, on-street running; and numerous planning, heritage, environmental, rights of way and property issues, including listed building and conservation area consent applications.

2 Our team

The team we proposed at the time comprised the most experienced lawyers working in the field of TWA Order promotions. Their experience at the time was as follows:

Lead Partner

Paul Thompson (Partner and Roll 'A' Parliamentary Agent)

Originally qualifying as a barrister in 1977, Paul became a Roll A parliamentary agent in 1982 and a solicitor in 1990. He is recommended as one of the leading Parliamentary Agents by *The Legal 500* and the *Chambers UK Guide to the Legal Profession*. Paul is particularly experienced in the authorisation of major projects and the planning, environmental and other policies relating to them. He acted for Cambridgeshire County Council on its successful application for a Transport and Works Act (TWA) order for the proposed Cambridgeshire guided busway. He also acted for the Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive in relation to the authorisation of its Metrolink system, including promoting five Private Acts and 14 TWA orders for that purpose as well as the Leigh Guided Busway Order 2005. On behalf

of Hampshire County Council and Portsmouth City Council, he promoted the TWA Order (2001) for the South Hampshire Rapid Transit System and has also assisted with the firm's DLR extension promotions.

Core Team

Nicholas Evans (Partner)

Nick was part of our team working on the TWA Order application by Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire County Council for the proposed two extensions to the Nottingham Express Transit System. He has also advised Nottingham City Council in relation to its proposed work-place parking levy. Nick has advised Merseytravel in relation to the proposed Merseytram scheme, and Docklands Light Railway Limited on the DLR extensions to Silvertown and London City Airport (recently opened), Woolwich Arsenal and Stratford International. Nick acted for numerous clients affected by the Crossrail Bill, including BAA, for whom he negotiated an agreement regulating Crossrail's interface with the Heathrow Express, and the Association of Train Operating Companies.

Mothiur Rahman (Senior Associate)

Mothiur's experience included advising Transport for London (TfL) in relation to the prospective promotion of a Transport and Works Act Order for the West London Tram scheme; advising in relation to objections to Transport and Works Act Orders including TfL's Victoria Station Upgrade (VSU) scheme; and advising a number of objectors to the Crossrail Bill, including drafting the petitions and attending hearings before the House of Commons Select Committee. Mothiur also advises on a number of planning matters, including advising in relation to planning issues, listed building consents and conservation area consents for Transport and Works Act Orders; and advising in relation to s.106 agreements.

Rahul Bijlani (Associate)

Rahul had extensive experience advising on planning and local government law, compulsory purchase, highways, and consents required for the development of major projects. His experience includes advising: Transport for London on its TWA Order application for the VSU scheme and on the prospective Transport and Works Act Order application for the West London Tram scheme; Docklands Light Railway Limited on its successful planning application for the proposed Stratford Regional Station redevelopment; Transport for London on a variation to the existing congestion charging scheme and on a new scheme for a London-wide Low Emissions Zone; tie (Transport Initiatives Edinburgh) on the two Bills promoted in the Scottish Parliament, enacted in 2006, authorising Edinburgh's proposed two-line tram system; clients petitioning against the Crossrail Bill; and Dartford Borough Council on a compulsory purchase order for the Bridge Project, a major mixed-use development in the Thames Gateway.

Support Team

Robbie Owen (Partner and Roll 'A' Parliamentary Agent)

Described by *Chambers UK Guide to the Legal Profession* as "dynamic and energetic" and "respected for his effectiveness with light railway schemes" and recommended in the *Legal*

500 for both planning work and parliamentary work, Robbie specialises in the promotion and implementation of major infrastructure projects. Robbie is a Roll 'A' Parliamentary Agent, had been a partner at Bircham Dyson Bell since 1991 and was then head of our Major Projects Group. He had been involved with many major infrastructure schemes acting for both promoters and objectors. Significant major infrastructure projects that Robbie had been involved with and which are of particular relevance here include: acting jointly for Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire County Council on the TWA Order application for two prospective extensions to the Nottingham Express Transit system; advising Merseytravel on its successful promotion of a TWA Order authorising the proposed Merseytram Line 1 scheme for Liverpool; acting for Docklands Light Railway Limited on the successful promotion of TWA Orders for the Docklands Light Railway extensions to London City Airport, Woolwich Arsenal and Stratford International and on the current promotion of the TWA Order for the proposed DLR extension to Dagenham Dock; acting for Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council in the successful promotion of a TWA order for the Knowsley Rail Freight Terminal (now constructed); and promoting for the Environment Agency the Wye Navigation TWA Order 2002 and the Wye Navigation Byelaws 2003.

Francis Tyrrell (Senior Associate)

Francis had advised upon a number of major infrastructure projects. In particular he had been a key member of our team advising P&O Ports/DP World on obtaining statutory authorisation for the large London Gateway container port project and Docklands Light Railway Limited on various aspects of the Stratford International Extension, including Olympic interfaces as well as railway industry-specific matters. Francis was part of our team advising Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire County Council on its application for a Transport and Works Act Order to authorise two extensions of the Nottingham Express Transit system, the subject of a seven-week public inquiry in 2007. Francis assisted with the firm's public procurement work and, for example, was then working on the arrangements for the operation of the Cambridgeshire Guided Busway by way of contracts with bus operators.

Alex Hallatt (Solicitor)

Alex was advising Docklands Light Railway Limited on the implementation of its compulsory purchase powers for the City Airport and Woolwich Arsenal extensions. In particular, Alex had been working on the acquisition of land for DLRL by the General Vesting Declaration and notices to treat procedures as well as by consensual transfer. He had also been part of the team advising Transport for London in connection with the proposed Woolwich town centre redevelopment. Alex acted for objectors to the Crossrail scheme and also has experience advising on planning matters. Alex was also assisting on aspects of the then proposed TWA Order for the DLR extension to Dagenham Dock.

Pam Thompson (Parliamentary Clerk)

Pam had undertaken Parliamentary legal work for over 30 years, 18 of those with Bircham Dyson Bell. She had vast experience in the preparation of the documentation for, and the procedures relating to the promotion of and objections to, Transport and Works Act Orders, Harbour Orders, Private and Hybrid Bills, and other forms of legislation. Pam also provided a specialist monitoring service to clients on legislative developments. She is the Honorary Secretary and Treasurer to the Parliamentary Clerks' Society.

Appendix E

Experience of Aecom in relation to NGT. The following advice note was produced by Aecom to demonstrate their relevant experience.

Introduction

This note has been prepared in response to a request by Andrew Wheeler of Leeds City Council. It first reproduced the experience in multimodal transport modelling that was provided in our submission to undertake the development of the Leeds Transport Model. The subsequent section then provides a brief summary of more recent projects and clients where we have undertaken similar work.

Original Evidence provided for LTM Work

This section sets out our company experience that is relevant in relation to this tender. This includes work covering the following areas:

- Demand modelling;
- Strategic modelling;
- Model development;
- Modelling TIF strategies in a metropolitan area;
- Translating complex transport strategies into strategic model applications;
- Interpretation of model outputs from complex strategy tests to provide decision makers with clear, summarised results;
- Interfacing model outputs with appraisal; and
- Local knowledge.

SWYMBUS Post TPI Modelling (Highways Agency, 2005, £1,132,415)

The Highways Agency commissioned Faber Maunsell to develop a new suite of models to test the SWYMBUS motorway widening proposals on the M1 and M62 in South and West Yorkshire. This involved building a suite of models to form a full VaDMA compliant approach. A strategic SATURN model and two VISSIM microsimulation models form the highway element of the suite with the variable demand modelling being carried out using a Demand Model developed by Faber Maunsell.

The SATURN model was built using data from over 250 RSI sites with a network of over 3000 simulation nodes. This model has been validated to an acceptable standard within the area of influence of the proposed schemes. The data from the SATURN model is fed down into the Vissim microsimulation models and up into the variable demand model. The variable demand model is fully compliant with VaDMA and had been approved by the Highways Agency. It is built using the Emme/3 software as a platform. These models have been used to assess the operational impacts of the schemes and then feed data into other assessment models such as TUBA, INCA, QUADRO and environmental assessment packages.

The Vissim models have been used in conjunction with the Vissim Interface Panel (VIP) to design Integrated Demand Management measures for the motorway network in South and West Yorkshire.

Many of the staff included in this project proposal have been involved within the SWYMBUS project. The overall study was managed by Alison Cox with Stuart Dalglish managing the task of building the SATURN model. Stuart McNaughton was heavily involved in the network building and the calibration and validation of the SATURN model. Ian Taylor was responsible for developing the highway matrices from the RSI data with Colin Capelle assisting him. Ian was also responsible for adapting the variable demand model from a previous study to make it compatible with SWYMBUS.

In many ways the SWYMBUS study is similar to the Leeds model as it involved developing a highway model from a series of RSI sites and other infill demand data. SWYMBUS also required the adoption of the Faber Maunsell's demand model to suit the local modelling situation.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓	✓		✓

East of England Regional Model (2005-2008, Highways Agency, £577,000)

Drawing on previously developed regional model, this work involved the integration with the BAA/Stansted modelling and further refinement of the model in the M1 corridor. Current work involves the improvement of model data in the Norfolk/Suffolk area. The regional model has been the subject of considerable development work undertaken by Faber Maunsell. A fully WebTAG compliant demand model structure (utilising EMME/3 software) has been created to determine modal choice and tackle variable demand responses to a range of interventions including road user charging. This demand model is widely regarded as the most appropriately structured and well validated example of its kind in the UK at present, and its basic structure will be adopted for the model development now proposed in Leeds. This work was led by Paul Hanson. Denvil Coombe is employed as an advisor to BAA on this project.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Non-Airport Demand Model (£2005-6, BAA / Hyder, £50,000)

Used for the Programme for the Sustainable Development of Heathrow (PSDH), this study involved an adaptation of the M25 model integrating bespoke air demand models, SATURN highway models and an EMME/2 WebTAG compliant variable demand model. The model was applied to test a range of strategies to seek to reduce traffic levels in the vicinity of Heathrow to assess what measures might be taken to improve air quality in the vicinity of the airport. This work was led by Paul Hanson. Denvil Coombe was BAA's technical director on PSDH.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

West Midlands TIF (2006/07 West Midlands Metropolitan Councils & West Midlands PTA, £680,000)

Faber Maunsell was appointed to lead two main phases of work, this first culminating in the publication, in September 2006, of a landmark consultative document 'Gridlock or Growth – Choices and Challenges for the Future' and the second leading to the production of technical documentation underpinning the metropolitan-wide Integrated Transport Strategy. In addition to providing the overall management of the multi-disciplinary consultancy group, Faber Maunsell was responsible for:

- The assessment of current transport problems and the development of the 'strategic case' for intervention;
- The assessment of options for Transport Infrastructure and service improvements in 20 travel corridors;
- Specifying enhancements to transport demand modelling tools to enable the impacts of complex congestion management strategies to be quantified;
- The assessment of impact of various demand management strategies on freight distribution
- The appraisal of the costs and benefits of Integrated Transport Strategy options covering both public and private sectors;
- The development of the functional design and business case for road user charging options;
- In-depth studies to assess the impact of Transport Strategy options on business competitiveness.

Paul Knight was project director for this study. The knowledge gained from this study provides us with a very good insight into the TIF process. This is knowledge that we can apply to the development of the Leeds modelling suite to ensure it is capable of modelling TIF related schemes. Denvil Coombe was responsible for auditing the modelling on behalf of the DfT. This provides us with an insight into TIF modelling practices and the acceptability of them with the DfT.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Greater Manchester TIF (2007 Greater Manchester PTE and Manchester City Council, £1M+)

The Faber Maunsell input to the TIF bid for Greater Manchester has encompassed the following projects:

- Congestion Charging Project – scheme design, appraisal and modelling support, traffic engineering, infrastructure costing.
- Regional Centre Transport Strategy – bus strategy development, complementary access strategy, parking strategy, traffic management, interchange development.
- Development of Corridor Partnerships – baseline studies and Action Plans, stakeholder consultation.
- Second City Metrolink Crossing Optioneering – rail engineering, transport planning, outline business case, traffic and junction modelling.
- Bus Transit Scheme Development (2 schemes) – scheme development including traffic engineering, transport planning, traffic and junction modelling, traffic management, traffic signals design, outline business case.
- Bus Priority Measures – design and prioritisation of 30 potential corridors, requiring traffic engineering, junction modelling and design, traffic signal design.
- Preparation of Full Business Cases for four schemes and support to the GMPTE on a number of other schemes.

The work has been undertaken in an informal partnership with GMPTE and Manchester City Council, and involved very close working with their officers, and occasional secondments into their offices. Denvil Coombe was responsible for auditing the modelling on behalf of the DfT. This provides us with an insight into TIF modelling practices and the acceptability of them with the DfT.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓				✓

Tyne and Wear TIF (2007/8 Newcastle City Council, £300,000)

Faber Maunsell was commissioned by the local authorities in Tyne and Wear to prepare a Transport Innovation Fund Outline Business Case. This work commenced with a thorough review of the problems and issues facing the Tyne and Wear area both now and in the future. We then developed packages of measures and strategies to deal with these problems with Road User charging cordons and zones forming an integral part of these packages. These packages were modelled using an existing strategic transport model. An appraisal methodology was developed and this was used to compare the various packages against each other and against the objectives of the project. Mike Scott was project manager for this study.

This project has also provided us with a useful insight into the modelling requirements for a TIF bid.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓				✓

Stansted G2 (2004-, BAA, £4m)

In responding to the 2004 Air Transport White Paper, BAA undertook studies to understand the context of regional growth within which Stansted operates, and to develop proposals, working with the Highways Agency, DfT and Network Rail to support the surface access needs of travel to the airport in this context. Part of this work involved the development of regional multimodal forecasting models, consistent with best current practice, and their application to forecast the performance of the transport network in the broad vicinity of Stansted and to identify a range of measures to facilitate airport and regional growth, in particular along the M11 corridor and the West Anglia Main Line rail corridor. The integrated model suite included a WebTAG compliant demand model, using Emme/2, regional and local SATURN traffic models, use of PLANET (the emme/2 based DfT rail models) and airport specific mode share models. This work was led by Paul Hanson. Denvil Coombe is employed as an advisor to BAA on this project.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

M25 North of Thames Demand Model (2005-7, Highways Agency / Hyder, £200,000)

To support the M25 rapid widening proposals this commission involved the development of a multimodal variable demand model, compliant with WebTAG guidance, to forecast the demand responses to options to improve the M25. The model was developed using Emme/2 and integrates with a SATURN highway assignment model. A number of option tests were undertaken. This project was led by Paul Hanson. Denvil Coombe is employed as an advisor to Hyder Consulting on this project.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
	✓	✓	✓	✓

Thames Gateway Regional Demand Model (2006/7, Essex / Mouchel Parkman, £70,000)

In supporting the development of a transport strategy for the Southend/Basildon, Thames Gateway area, this commission involves the development of a multi-modal transport model. This model integrating Omnitrans highway and bus models and an EMME/3 WebTAG compliant variable demand model. This work was led by Paul Hanson.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓			

Tees Valley Development Study (2007, Tees Valley JSU, £72,400)

The Tees Valley Development Study seeks to develop an Area Action Plan through which the strategic development aspirations in the Tees Valley can be accommodated. This has involved using a TRIPS multimodal model developed by another consultant in order to assess the impacts and develop schemes to mitigate these. A spreadsheet growth model was built in order to correctly assess the trip generation of the proposed development sites. A total of 4 future years and two growth scenarios were tested. The TRIPS model has been interfaced with a VISSIM model of the strategic roads in the area to assist in the identification of impacts and potential mitigation measures. During this project Faber Maunsell developed a MapInfo tool to take TRIPS outputs and convert them into a map based format. This project is currently on hold due to Faber Maunsell identifying an issue with the distribution model supplied by the client. Mike Scott was project director for this work and Stuart Dalgleish project manager with Mark Roth providing the mapping expertise.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

South Yorkshire Strategic Transport Model (South Yorkshire Authorities, 2007/8, £200,000 + Surveys)

Faber Maunsell has recently been appointed by all four South Yorkshire Local Authorities to undertake roadside interviews in order to update the SWYMBUS SATURN model to make it suitable for testing the cross boundary impacts of transport proposals across South Yorkshire. This commission has a strong multi-modal element by virtue of the development and inclusion of a public transport model and making adjustments to the SWYMBUS demand model to improve the mode choice elements. Mike Scott is project director for this study and Stuart Dalgleish is project manager.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
	✓	✓	✓	

York Central Transport Masterplan Study (2003, City of York Council – £125,000)

The York Central site is in the Centre of York adjacent to the rail station. It is derelict rail land that is a potential development site for employment uses, creating up to 10,000 jobs. In addition 3000 houses could be located on the site but access to the site is restricted due to live rail lines along each perimeter. This study made use of the York SATURN highway and Park & Ride model to assess the impact of the development along with identifying the effects of potential access points. An EMME/2 public transport model was constructed in order to assess options for improving public transport accessibility to the site, including BRT and LRT options. The commission included a feasibility study of each access point. Mike Scott was project manager for this study.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Edinburgh Tram (2003, Transport Initiatives Edinburgh, £900,000)

Faber Maunsell was commissioned by Transport Initiatives Edinburgh to carry out all necessary work to complete the Scottish Transport Appraisal Guidance (STAG) Parts One and Two Assessments for the proposed second line of the Edinburgh Tram system (West Edinburgh). Faber Maunsell undertook all technical, operational and environmental work to take Line Two of the Edinburgh Tram network through a public exhibition, and to enable the Council to promote the passage of a Private Bill through the Scottish Parliament. Of particular relevance is the use of a city-wide multi-modal TRIPS model to assess the scheme.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Nexus VISUM PT Model (2008 Nexus, £527,000)

Faber Maunsell has a framework agreement with Nexus. As part of the framework we are developing a Public Transport Model using the Visum software. This model is being used to assess current and future accessibility levels as well as the demand implications of changes to public transport services and the introduction of bus priority measures. This work is being carried out as part of a wider project to develop an ideal bus network for the Tyne and Wear area.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓			✓	✓

Multi-Modal Studies e.g. London to South Midlands (1988 to 2002)

Faber Maunsell recently led a number of major multimodal studies. These studies were instrumental in developing many of the variable demand modelling techniques that are now contained in DfT guidance. In the London to South Midlands corridor, for example, Faber Maunsell led a team of transportation planners, engineers, economists and environmentalists to investigate multi-modal solutions to a range of congestion and accessibility problems in the South Midlands. The study area, bounded by the M25, M1, A14 and M11 was subject to particularly strong development pressures both in the M11 corridor and in a major planning growth area focused on Milton Keynes. The study area also included several areas of deprivation for which improved accessibility, particularly to major economic centres, was a key objective. The area included three major north-south highway corridors (M1, A1(M), M11) and the corresponding rail lines (WCML, MML, ECML, WAGN), as well as a number of lower quality east-west highways and a potential east-west rail route. It contained two major airports at Luton and Stansted, and a regional airport at Cambridge.

Strategy / Scheme Development	Demand Modelling	Highway Modelling	Public Transport Modelling	Appraisal
✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Allied to this extensive modelling experience, Faber Maunsell can also offer significant local experience. Our Leeds City Centre office is one of our key national centres of excellence for transport modelling and we have deployed this experience, along with our full range of other skills, for our clients in West Yorkshire over many years. Examples of our recent experience include:

- Development of Major Scheme Business Cases for investment at Wakefield Westgate Station, the A65 Kirkstall Road Bus Corridor and the region’s successful “MyBus” programme for school travel investment.
- Undertaking a high profile rail study for the Caldervale Line in conjunction with a full range of public and private sector stakeholders.
- Appraisal of public transport options in the A660 Otley Road Corridor, the Aire Valley corridor in East Leeds and, at a smaller scale, for the semi-rural community at Scholes.
- Developing new arrangements for ticketing in West Yorkshire including working with partners to develop proposals for extending the Metrocard scheme into neighbouring authorities beyond the West Yorkshire boundary.

Illustration of Contemporary Experience

Selection of commissions undertaken since commencement of the work on the Leeds Transport Model. These are selected to be multi-modal and including some aspects of local urban public transport planning. There are many wider examples of relevant modelling work, which focus more strongly on highway rail and active modes, together with a range of research and advisory activity.

Client	Date	Nature of Work
TfL	2008-	Extensive range of individual commissions supporting TfL develop, maintain and apply their multi-model London modelling suite. This has included expert advice in developing their tools, developments to demand modelling, highway and public transport assignment tools and their application to appraise a wide range of highway and public transport interventions.
SYPT	2008-	Development and maintenance of multimodal transport modelling capability for Sheffield City Region. Tasks undertaken include integrating transport and land use models, and appraisal of a range of transport schemes.
Leicestershire	2008-	Responsibility for update and maintenance of the county multimodal model, together with its use to consider spatial and transport strategy, assess the transport impacts of developments, secure planning consent and funding for transport interventions, road, bus and active modes.
Kirklees	2013-	Development of multi-model transport model designed initially to develop local transport strategy.
Hertfordshire	2009 -	Transport planning framework providing support developing local spatial and transport strategies, supporting associated development and use of transport models, together with development of a new county wide transport model.
Central Bedfordshire	2009-	Framework supporting maintenance and use of multi-modal county model. Applications to support DCO procedures securing approval for transport interventions
Brighton	2013-	Framework to maintain and apply multi-modal transport model
Transport Scotland	2012-	Auditor for TS modelling suite, technically overseeing national, regional and local model development, with formal audits of 8 model developments. Business case development and supporting model use for national scale programmes (rail and road)
TfGM	2012-	Preparation of business cases for a range of potential metro and tram-train developments to the Manchester public transport network.
RATP	2013-	Update to their short term transport policy model, IMPACT, with responsibility for all supply model development, rail, bus, metro and highway.
STEAM	2008-	Maintenance and support of the Abu Dhabi multi-modal transport model, both supporting use and undertaking business case assessments of a diverse range of transport interventions.

Appendix F

Experience of KPMG in relation to NGT. The following advice note was produced by KPMG to demonstrate their relevant experience.

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4 August 2016

Dear Andrew

In response to your recent email request, please find below our summary of corporate experience relevant to NGT and relevant CVs of our senior team members, Richard Threlfall and Jonathan Turton.

Our role in relation to NGT was to advise on the appropriate approach to and structuring of procurement. We assisted in the translating of objectives for the scheme to establish proposed contract risk allocation parameters. We produced the project financial model which assisted the Council/WYCA to understand the overall project cost and revenue in the form of a projected 30 year cashflow and we contributed to the development of the proposed approach to performance.

Our team was not involved in any aspect of the Public Inquiry process nor were we asked to contribute.

Yours sincerely,



Jonathan Turton,
Director, Deal Advisory, Infrastructure

1 KPMG experience relevant to NGT

Set out below is a list of recent and relevant UK experience selected from a much wider range of projects. If you require further information or examples we are happy to provide them. We have also included a table of our recent awards in the infrastructure and transport sectors to demonstrate our recognition by the market.

Project	KPMG Role
Nottingham Express Transit Phase 2 Procurement	Financial and commercial adviser to Tralink Consortium (bidder)
Manchester Metrolink	Financial and commercial adviser to National Express (bidder)
Mersey Gateway	Financial and commercial adviser to Halton Borough Council (authority)
DfT Franchise process (including Essex Thameside, Thameslink, ScotRail, Inter City East Coast and Crossrail franchises)	Leading advisor to UK train operators (various). We also advised DfT on the review of its commercial model via the 2010 Franchise Review.
Operator of Last Resort (East Coast services)	Advised DfT on the successful separation and transfer of the franchise to Directly Operated Railways (DOR)
HS2 Strategic and Financial cases	Ongoing advice to DfT on the Strategic and Financial Cases
Crossrail 2	Financial and Commercial Advisor to TfL
Thameslink (£1.6bn) and IEP (Great Western and East Coast, £4.6bn) rolling stock procurement	Financial advisor to DfT
Transport Fund and Metrolink Programme	Lead strategic, financial and economic advisor to Transport for Greater Manchester

2 KPMG financial and transport advisor awards

— Financial Adviser of the Year Partnership Awards 2016
— Financial Adviser of the Year IJ Global 2015
— Financial Advisor of the Year –Transport Infrastructure Awards (2013, 2012, 2008, 2007, 2006)
— InfraDealGlobal League Table ranked 1st 2015
— European Roads Deal of the Year Infrastructure IJGlobal2014 (Mersey Gateway)
— European Roads Deal of the Year Infrastructure IJGlobal2015 (M11 Ireland)
— Europe Infra Deal of the Year (Thames Tideway) PFI Awards 2015
— Infra Deal of the Year (Europe) Mersey Gateway PFI Awards 2014

3 CVs

We have provided below CVs for the partner and director directly responsible for our advice in relation to NGT, Richard Threlfall and Jonathan Turton.

Richard Threlfall

MA (University of Oxford), MBA (Cranfield), Fellow of the Institution of Civil Engineers



Position

- Partner, Global Head of Public Transport
- UK Head, Infrastructure, Building and Construction
- Chair, Infrastructure Forum Advisory Council

Experience

Richard has over 20 years' experience advising private and public sector clients on the structuring, procurement and financing of major infrastructure projects

Between 2000 and 2003 Richard was Vice President at Citigroup in the Infrastructure Advisory Group. Richard joined a highly respected financial advisory team and led a number of high profile advisory mandates including Air Traffic Control privatisation and Manchester Metrolink.

Between 1993 and 2000 Richard held a variety of senior positions in the UK Department for Transport, including Private Secretary to Sir George Young, the Secretary of State for Transport and Private Secretary to John Prescott, the Deputy Prime Minister. In 1998 he led the team responsible for the financial aspects of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link restructuring and refinancing, before taking oversight of Railtrack and the Office of Rail Regulation.

A selection of Richard's relevant sector experience with KPMG includes:

- Advisor to Transport for London on Crossrail 2
- Advisor to the UK Department for Transport on the governance and funding of HS2
- Advisor to Network Rail on a potential major divestment
- Advised Thames Water on the Thames Tideway Tunnel project
- Advised Halton Borough Council on the Mersey Gateway Bridge PPP project
- Advised Alstom, Keolis, Vinci and Trent Barton on Nottingham Express Transit Phase 2
- Advised the Railway Procurement Agency on the Dublin Metro project
- Advised Colas on the Sheffield and Isle of Wight road maintenance projects
- Advised the Stockholm Transport Authority on the Stockholm Tram project
- Advised the Welsh Assembly Government on the proposed M4 Toll Road
- Advised the Austrian road agency, ASFINAG, on the "Ostregion" DBFO roads
- Advised Strukton and NedRailways on the Stockholm Tram project
- Advised the Northern Ireland Roads Service on their two packages of DBFO roads
- Advised BAA on road and rail enhancements to support the expansion of Stansted Airport
- Advised the UK Government on the 2004 Rail Review.

Jonathan Turton

BSc Hons Accounting and Finance (1998); Associate of Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (2001)



Position

Director - Deal Advisory Infrastructure, Head of Infrastructure in the North

Experience

Jon has 18 years' experience at KPMG and qualified as a Chartered Accountant in 2001. Since 2003 he has led a wide range of high profile engagements and has closed over a dozen projects. Selected project experience (excluding NGT) includes:

- National Express: Jon was lead commercial adviser to National Express for its 2016 bid to operate the Manchester Metrolink, with a focus on performance and passenger experience.
- Jon is currently leading the team advising TfL on the proposed Silvertown Tunnel PPP. In particular Jon is focussed on the procurement approach, the performance regime and the financial structuring.
- Mersey Gateway: Jon led the team that advised Halton Borough Council all the way from Programme Entry to a successful financial close for the Mersey Gateway project.
- West Yorkshire: Jon was a key member of the team advising West Yorkshire on its Transport Infrastructure fund. In particular Jon led the work on the financial parameters of the Fund including the development of a fund specific financial model and external funding;
- South Yorkshire: Jon was a key member of the team advising South Yorkshire on its cross sector Infrastructure fund. Jon leads the work around funding sources and how to pull those together coherently as well as the economic prioritisation of potential projects;
- New M4 project: Jon was responsible for the day to day management of the team advising Transport Wales on the proposed New M4 Project up to 2009. Jon led the development of the commercial aspects, business case and financial structure of the project;
- Glasgow City Council: Jon was a key member of the team advising Glasgow on the establishment of a transport focussed Infrastructure fund and city deal.
- CNDR: Jon was part of the team advising Cumbria County Council on the Carlisle Northern Development Route, a PFI road scheme which achieved financial close in summer 2009;
- Hull City Council Building Schools for the Future project: Jon led KPMG's support to the Authority throughout the process, from the completion of strategic and outline business cases, through to financial close of each of the three phases;
- Eric Wright Group: Jon has advised Eric Wright Group through a successful financial close in January 2009 for tranche 4 of the Wigan and Leigh LIFT project. This role included the identification and selection of a new senior lender in very difficult market conditions. This project represents the eighth PFI project that KPMG have advised EWG on through to a successful financial close, and Jon's fourth.

In addition Jon writes frequently for the trade press, including being recently quoted in the FT in relation to the Northern Powerhouse. He speaks regularly at conferences and was chair of the Welsh Infrastructure Conference in 2014, sits on the Infrastructure Forums "Innovative Finance" working group and "Regions" working group and drafted the Forums response to the Autumn Statement in 2015 as well as KPMG's formal response to the HMT consultation on PF2.

Submission to the Leeds City Council Scrutiny Board (City Development)

By Peter Bonsall

I am Emeritus Professor of Transport Planning at the University of Leeds. My specialism has been demand forecasting and policy appraisal and I have been an advisor to numerous organisations including DfT, DTI, Cabinet Office, Highways Agency, EU Commission, US DOT, Rijkswaterstaat, Scottish Government, WYPTE, GMPTE, Leeds City council and other UK local authorities.

I have taken a particular interest in the successive proposals for transport schemes in the A660 corridor and was heavily involved in the NGT Public Inquiry as an expert witness on aspects of the Business Case and I conducted the main technical cross-examination of the consultants who appeared for the promoters.

This document has been prepared for the Board's meeting on 23rd November 2016 in response to its invitation to me to give my views on (1) the lessons to be learned and applied following the failure of the Supertram and NGT projects, (2) on local community engagement in the development of future transport schemes and projects and (3) on what solutions and options should be considered.

1 Lessons to be learned from Supertram and NGT

The history of the Supertram and NGT schemes is a sad one. It has involved considerable waste of public resources, decades of delay in addressing Leeds's transport problems and consequent frustration for the city's people and businesses. It is tempting to blame Whitehall and Westminster for having seemed to encourage the projects and ultimately to have refused to fund them but I believe that much of the problem lies closer to home.

Respecting Supertram, the problem seems to have been one of unrealistically high ambitions; the scheme for which funding was eventually sought was clearly larger than DfT were willing to accept and its business case was not sound. These proved to be fatal flaws when combined with unfortunate timing - had a smaller scheme been brought forward while tram schemes were popular with government then Leeds might have received funding for a scheme which might later have been extended.

Respecting NGT, the eventual rejection of the scheme at the Public Inquiry was due to the fundamental weakness of its Business Case (opposition from local communities and businesses was significant but would not have swayed the Inspector had the Business Case been sound). This weakness was, in my opinion, due to an over-hasty decision to pursue a trolleybus scheme as a kind of "supertram-lite" and to implement the main part of the scheme in the A660 corridor - where segregation from other traffic is difficult to achieve.

Following its rejection of Supertram, the Government invited Leeds to submit a bus-based scheme to address its transport problems. The invitation could have been responded to in various ways each of which could have resulted in significant and rapid improvements to Leeds's transport system. The decision to pursue a trolleybus scheme seems to have been swayed by the fact that it would allow the scheme to be pursued via a Transport and Works Act Order - thereby allowing the promoters to control its operation and take the revenues - and by the fact that it appeared able to make use of much of the design work which had previously been done for Supertram (even though, in practice, much of the design work had to be revised). The decision to focus on the A660/A61 route was

undoubtedly influenced by the prospect of abstracting a significant share of the revenues currently enjoyed by buses in the A660 corridor.

The decision to implement a trolleybus scheme in the A660/A61 corridors having been made, it evidently proved impossible to design a robust scheme which met the city's wider objectives (given the government injunction that the scheme should not have an unduly adverse impact on other traffic, it was not possible to squeeze a trolleybus into the A660 corridor without compromising the performance of the new mode). Although this problem should have been recognised at an early stage and an alternative approach explored, what actually happened was that a case for the trolleybus scheme was prepared relying on some quite extraordinary assumptions, playing down the negative impacts of the scheme and ignoring the potential benefits of alternative approaches (the Business Case did include discussion of a so called "Next Best Alternative" and of a "Low Cost Option", but the promoters' consultants are on record as having stated that these variants should not be regarded as the best alternatives to NGT that could have been developed). The failure seriously to consider other options was not only bad practice (because it resulted in more cost-effective options being ignored) but was contrary to government advice and was criticised by the Inspector.

Some senior staff and councillors were clearly unaware of the fundamental weaknesses in the Business Case which came to light during the Inquiry. A detailed and impartial examination of the case at an early stage would have revealed a number of issues of real concern - most notably that the forecasts for trolleybus revenue and job creation were based on some quite extraordinary assumptions which were contrary to available evidence, and that, even on the basis of the flawed forecasts, the trolleybus scheme clearly failed to meet many of the objectives which had been set for it (see appendix).

One can speculate as to why the fundamental weaknesses of the trolleybus scheme were not acknowledged at an early stage and why they did not emerge until the public Inquiry. Had senior people committed themselves to the scheme so publicly that they felt unable to withdraw their support? Had too much of Leeds's political capital in Westminster been used up in lobbying for the scheme? Had the scheme's supposed role in overcoming barriers to development been given so much emphasis that its abandonment might have harmed the city's efforts to attract new developments? Had so much time, effort and resources been invested in the scheme that abandonment seemed inconceivable? Had the promoters' consultants failed to inform their clients of the weaknesses in the case (perhaps thinking it would be impolitic to be seen to be questioning the case for the scheme)? Had the consultants themselves not recognised the weaknesses?

The role of consultants in the whole process deserves particular attention and it is interesting to note that the brief given to the main analytical consultants was apparently to support the promoters' attempts to achieve funding for the identified scheme. There seems to have been no serious effort by Leeds or METRO to seek advice on whether the trolleybus scheme represented the best response to the Government's invitation or on whether the business case was robust. The employment of competent and independent expert advisors at an early stage could have avoided the eventual outcome. The appendix to this note exemplifies the specific issues which an independent assessor might have been asked to address and the issues which their investigation might have uncovered had they been given full access to the relevant material.

As to the role of Whitehall and Westminster in the NGT story, it is understandable that the rejection of the NGT scheme might leave Leeds feeling let down after receiving seemingly encouraging noises at earlier stages. However, it should be noted that the decisions to pursue a trolleybus option and to

implement it in the A660 corridor were made by the promoters rather than by DfT or ministers and that successive letters from DfT made it clear that their approval of the scheme at the various interim stages was always subject to their approval at subsequent stages and most particularly to their acceptance of the Final Business Case. There is ample evidence (quoted at the Inquiry) to indicate that DfT officials had reservations about various aspects of the scheme and no doubt at all that the Inspector concluded that the scheme was flawed. There was clearly a substantial amount of political lobbying for the scheme and some suggestion in a speech by former Minister of Transport Norman Baker that there had been political pressure to grant approval to the scheme at one (at least) of the milestones. It may be that efforts of friendly ministers to help the scheme proceed despite their officials' reservations simply delayed the eventual outcome.

The Public Inquiry may have seemed like an expensive inconvenience and source of delay to the NGT project but Leeds should be thankful that there was a mechanism which resulted in the weaknesses of the scheme becoming known before it was too late. Without it, more resources would have been expended and the project would have passed to the next stage (submission of the Final Business Case). If DfT/Treasury scrutiny had been rigorous at this final stage the scheme would not have got funding but, worse, if the scrutiny had been superficial the scheme would have proceeded, much more money would have been spent and the inherent problems would eventually have come to light only when it became operational – with ongoing costs to the city and irreversible damage to the urban landscape and to local accessibility. Post devolution, with a reduced role for DfT, the need for this kind of mechanism, and for rigorous internal scrutiny of proposals, will be greater than ever.

It is no secret that many Leeds Councillors were surprised at the strength of opposition to the NGT scheme from some of the people who, it was thought, would stand to benefit most from it. This surprise was, in no small part, due to the fact that the promoters were relying on the positive results of a consultation exercise which had been conducted several years earlier on the general proposal for a rapid transit network. When people and small businesses along the route learned about the actual proposal they were unconvinced that the benefits claimed for it would outweigh the negative impacts on the local communities and townscape. The proposed scheme did not reflect their needs and aspirations and indeed tended to work against them. It may have been assumed that local businesses would follow the lead of a number of developers and large employers who had indicated support for the scheme but, in fact, the small businesses shared many of the concerns of local residents and community groups regarding the adverse impacts that the scheme would have had on local ambience and accessibility.

There was a significant budget for outreach and consultation but the effort seems to have been focussed on publicising the supposed benefits of the scheme rather than on genuine consultation. Local people and businesses were dismayed to learn that, although they were being invited to comment on detailed aspects of the proposal, the main features of the scheme were to be taken as given.

The existence of significant local opposition was noted by the Inspector and, even though it did not feature prominently among his reasons for rejecting the scheme, it will not have helped the promoters' case. Similarly, his confidence in the technical ability of the promoters' consultants will have been reduced by the fact that they had to acknowledge a number of errors in the analysis which came to light only after submission of their documents. Although the preparation of the trolleybus scheme had taken a considerable period of time, the technical work had clearly not been fully checked in advance of the Inquiry (revised calculations of key benefits were submitted by the

promoters after submission of their proofs of evidence and further errors came to light during cross-examination of their consultants).

Finally, it must be recognised that the focus on Supertram and then on NGT has meant that other, projects have been side-lined. The effect is particularly evident along the proposed trolleybus route where alternative, less glamorous but much more cost-effective, solutions to the undoubted local problems have simply not been pursued, but the diversion of so much time, effort and resources into Supertram and NGT must also have delayed the development of strategy and implementation of more modest schemes and proposals across the city as a whole.

So what are the lessons?

- I. The decision to pursue a particular approach or scheme should be made only after serious consideration of alternatives.
- II. Politicians should not commit themselves too firmly to any particular scheme before it has been subject to rigorous analysis.
- III. Attempts to influence opinion (of the public, of the business community or of the Government) in favour of a particular scheme should not begin until it is clear that it is actually the best option.
- IV. Consultants engaged to provide technical advice and assistance should be required to provide an honest and unbiased assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of each option rather than simply to provide analysis which supports a favourite scheme. This will become increasingly necessary as DfT's role in vetting proposals is reduced;
- V. Independent experts should be brought in to check the robustness of the analyses and, again, this will become increasingly necessary as DfT's role in vetting proposals is reduced;
- VI. The high level of local opposition to the trolleybus scheme resulted from the fact that the scheme did not address the needs and aspirations of the local communities and businesses and was exacerbated by the belief that the consultation had been inadequate (see below).
- VII. Undue concentration on a single major project diverts attention from the development of alternative strategies and from the implementation of less glamorous but potentially much more cost effective projects.

2 Public engagement and involvement in the delivery of transport schemes and projects

Genuine public consultation is generally hampered by communication difficulties. Unlike large corporates, the public often have disparate needs and aspirations which are difficult for policy makers to understand and reconcile and because the public are, in turn, rarely equipped to understand the detailed arguments put forward by policy analysts and technical experts. Their views and opinions may not become clear until specific proposals are articulated.

If the aim is to develop strategies and schemes which reflect the needs and aspirations of communities and stakeholders it is important first to find out what those needs and aspirations are. This requires an approach designed to understand those needs and aspirations rather than to promote any particular scheme or project. There is little point in wasting time on "motherhood and apple pie" questions to which the answers are already known (of course people want faster, cheaper, more comfortable, reliable and safer journeys, of course they want faster boarding times, of course they support the notion of a modern, fast and comfortable transport system) rather it is to identify perceived problems and to explore the trade-offs between different priorities.

The identification of problems should be unprompted and the trade-offs should seek to find out how people would prioritise between, for example; local access versus access to the city centre; easy access by car versus easy access by public transport; the needs of pedestrians and cyclists versus those of users of cars and buses; the needs of pedestrians versus those of cyclists; low fares versus high frequency; high frequency versus improved reliability; improvements in air quality versus economic growth; preservation of local townscape versus amelioration of congestion ... and so on. Other trade-offs have a very clear policy content but should not be shunned: expansion of Leeds Bradford Airport versus direct trains to Manchester Airport; improved rail access to other Yorkshire towns and cities versus faster rail access to larger cities elsewhere in the UK ... and so on. It is also useful to establish the willingness of communities and stakeholders to help pay for necessary improvements. Are they willing to see increased local taxation? Would they accept higher parking charges? Would they accept introduction of a congestion charge or of bottleneck-charges? Would they accept higher fares on buses or trains?

The investigation of needs, aspirations and trade-offs will reveal widely held aspirations and widespread needs but will also reveal inconsistencies and potential conflicts of interest. Policy analysts and decision makers then have the difficult task of developing technically sound strategies and proposals which are likely to deliver the greatest good for the greatest number.

Once policy proposals emerge, the involvement of community groups and stakeholders in the design process can engender a sense of engagement with, and even of “ownership” of, the resulting schemes. However, even if this approach is followed, it cannot hope to silence all opposition to a given scheme - some people will always feel that their views have been ignored or that those of other groups have been allowed to dominate. If the overall benefits of a proposal are overwhelming, it may simply become necessary to ignore opposition from narrow sectional interests.

Finally, the process of garnering public and stakeholder support for a particular option is quite different from consultation and should be kept quite separate from it.

3 Policy options for the short, medium and longer term

In keeping with the general objective of promoting a high level of affordable and environmentally benign accessibility, I would advocate a strategy for Leeds which seeks to make the best use of available networks and to improve them incrementally rather than to introduce a wholly new system simply for the sake of it. Similarly I endorse the city’s avowed strategy of seeking to encourage, where possible, the use of public transport and of active modes in preference to the private car. Interventions designed to promote these objectives should address existing and foreseeable problems.

Leeds’s existing strategies are generally sound but, in my opinion, they have been too closely linked to the introduction of new modes and the progress towards achievement of some key objectives has been disappointing. In particular, more needs to be done to tackle air pollution, to prioritise the needs of pedestrians, to reduce the dominance of cars in the urban landscape, and to improve the public transport offer. There also seems to have been relatively limited success in forward planning to ensure that major new developments are designed to promote use of public transport rather than of the private car.

It would, of course be inconsistent if I were to suggest that any specific proposal should be adopted without full analysis of its likely performance but I believe that there are some obvious candidates for consideration.

In the very short term there is much that could be achieved at relatively low cost by means of simple traffic management, minor engineering and/or administrative action. Examples include:

- agreement with bus operators to introduce newer less polluting vehicles, measures to speed up boarding times and increase service reliability, and better integration with rail services;
- provision of bus lanes where buses are held up in congestion and the existing carriageway can accommodate an extra lane or where existing space can be reallocated to buses¹;
- use of existing signals to prioritise buses (sometimes in conjunction with minor traffic engineering measures, such as banned turns, designed to increase junction capacity);
- provision of faster response to pedestrian calls at a number of signalised crossing points;
- improved facilities at rail stations and major bus stops (including continued roll-out of real-time bus information and provision of improved pick-up and set-down arrangements at Leeds City Station);
- introduction of newer rolling stock on the commuter rail services;
- introduction of a low emission zone within the city centre (and perhaps, in due course, through some of the suburban centres);
- low-cost measures to reduce car traffic into the city centre (e.g. use of available land to provide parking adjacent to suburban rail stations and upstream of bottlenecks on radial routes into the city centre, reduction in long-stay parking facilities in the city centre)
- banning of HGVs on certain roads during peak hours;
- enforcement of speed limits and parking restrictions in sensitive areas;
- more prominent signing of pedestrian routes; and
- “smart” initiatives such as short term bike rental and the re-introduction of “walking buses” - perhaps in tandem with provision for set down and pick up away from school gates.

In the slightly longer term much might be achieved by relatively modest engineering to provide:

- increased rail capacity and turn-round facilities to enable more frequent services on the suburban stretches of regional rail lines;
- minor carriageway widening or re-alignment to provide additional bus lanes where necessary and appropriate;
- new signals providing priority to buses (including some “bus gates”);
- improved facilities for pedestrians and cyclists (including provision of more attractive pedestrian routes into the city centre);
- additional parking at those suburban rail stations which can act as park and ride sites;
- congestion relief at certain bottlenecks (though consideration must be given to the extent to which this might encourage additional road traffic).

¹ Interestingly, this, together with several other low cost items in this list, could make a real contribution to the solution of problems in the A660 corridor (the problems have long been recognised – most recently by the Inspector at the NGT enquiry - but their solution has been repeatedly postponed pending arrival of Supertram and then of NGT. Meanwhile the problems have not gone away: congestion persists, the pollution levels in Headingley are amongst the worst in the city, and 8 of the 44 sites in Leeds which give most cause for concern over safety are to be found in the corridor). A more detailed description of potential solutions for the A660 corridor may be found in Part A of the “Alternatives” document produced by the North West Leeds Transport Forum ;
<http://nwlftf.org.uk/docs/ngt/Alternative%20Transport%20strategy%20discussion%20doc.pdf>

In the medium term, but with preparations starting now, a number of more ambitious proposals deserve urgent attention². They include:

- introduction of more rail-based park and ride stations adjacent to the motorways or outer ring road (e.g. a new park and ride station at Horsforth Woodside³ next to the outer ring road could help reduce traffic on the A65, the A660 and on the roads in between and, since introduction of a new station will inevitably prolong the journey from more distant stations, consideration might simultaneously be given to replacing the Headingley and Burley Park stations by a new one at Headingley Stadium);
- provision of other new rail stations – particularly in conjunction with major developments such as the new housing to the east of the city (where a stretch of new line might also be justified) and southwest of Horsforth (where a new station next to the Outer Ring Road on the old Sandoz site might also fulfil a useful P&R function);
- provision of increased capacity at Leeds City Station and of longer platforms at some other stations (to facilitate longer trains and thus help reduce crowding on commuter services into Leeds);
- measures to reduce the dominance of car traffic on approaches to the city centre (in addition to traffic engineering measures designed to reduce through traffic, a substantial reduction in the number of cars entering the city centre might be achieved by introducing congestion charging, bottleneck charging, or increased parking charges or by significantly reducing the provision commuter parking in the city centre. However, such measures could harm the competitiveness of the Leeds economy unless public transport system has by then become a viable and genuinely attractive alternative);
- engineering and/or advanced signal technologies to provide increased capacity at key bottlenecks on Leeds's orbital routes (such as at the Armley Gyratory junction and at various intersections along the outer ring road).

The need for a new high capacity light rapid transport (LRT) system has yet to be proven. Leeds may be unique among large cities in not having such a system but that fact alone is insufficient reason to pursue that option because the geography of Leeds is also unique. There appears to be space to accommodate LRT in some of the radial corridors and, hopefully, the layout of new developments such as those on the South Bank have been designed to accommodate LRT services. However, further analysis is required to establish whether the benefits of an LRT system could not be delivered more quickly and at lower cost by a combination of more intensive use of the existing heavy rail network (with some extensions and new stations) and a serious commitment to real improvements in bus provision including an uncompromising approach to bus priority⁴.

² A longer list of candidate schemes and policies for is provided in part B of NWLTF's "Alternatives" document.

³ The idea of a P&R site at Horsforth Woodside is not new but it is interesting to note that one of the reasons given for not pursuing it was that it would compete with the proposed NGT P&R site at Bodington!

⁴ At the limit, a bus with absolute priority over other road traffic or benefitting from its own segregated track, can perform as effectively, or better than, a rail-based LRT system.

Briefing Document for an independent analyst seeking to assess the case for Trolleybus as presented at Public Inquiry (prepared 27/02/15 and revised in August 2015 to include reference to Devolution powers)

This document sets out some questions on which an independent analyst would wish to form a view. Under each question, attention is drawn to important evidence drawn from documents produced at the Inquiry – most of them by applicants' own consultants. The questions are:

- A. Does the proposed scheme fit with Leeds City Council's objectives?
- B. Are the revenue forecasts reliable?
- C. What implications would local control of buses (via a Quality Bus Contract or as part of a devolution agreement) have for the Trolleybus project?
- D. Were the performance and impacts of the trolleybus scheme accurately modelled?
- E. Is the result of the Cost Benefit Analysis credible? and
- F. Were alternative solutions properly investigated?

Further observations, directly addressing the issues on which the Secretaries of State wished to be informed by the Inquiry, are provided in the Closing Statement by North West Leeds Transport Forum (NWLTF). It, along with the documents referred to in the footnotes, is an Inquiry Document which can be found on the PA website <http://www.persona.uk.com/LTVS/index.htm>.

A. Does the proposed scheme fit with LCC's objectives (i.e. improved quality of life, reduced emissions, increased economic activity, etc.; as set out in the LDP and elsewhere)?

1. According to predictions set out in the Business Case and other documents prepared by the Applicants' consultants, introduction of the trolleybus would result in:
 - i. increased car mileage⁵, emissions⁶ and casualties⁷ (these predictions are due, not to the stimulation of extra trips, but to the fact that existing trips would become more circuitous),
 - ii. reduced use of active modes⁸,
 - iii. increased average journey times during the morning peak (summed across all modes)⁹,
 - iv. increased congestion (measured as lower average journey speeds for cars)¹⁰,
 - v. reduced connectivity (measured as increased average generalised cost of travelling – summed across all modes and time periods)¹¹,
 - vi. increased noise nuisance¹²,
 - vii. adverse impact on landscape and townscape¹³ and on heritage assets¹⁴,

⁵ Section C15 of NWLTF122 – original evidence from Table 58 of C-1-8 supplemented by data in first table of the penultimate page of APP103.

⁶ Table B1 of APP-7-3

⁷ Para 15.85 of C-1 also in Table 17.12 of C-1

⁸ Section C15 of NWLTF122 – original evidence in Table 12.4 of C-1 supplemented by data in first table on penultimate page of APP103

⁹ Section C9 of NWLTF122 – original evidence from APP103 page 7

¹⁰ See Table 7 of C-1-9

¹¹ Against a background of no increase in overall trip numbers, answer 8 in APP-105 shows increased person miles and answer 9 shows increased journey time (in each case summed over all modes for the morning peak). This implies increased trip cost. Note that these results relate only to the morning peak but that mileage data in APP-122 suggests that the effect is present in all time periods.

¹² Para 17.28 and Table 17.11 of C-1

¹³ Para 17.28 and Table 17.11 of C-1

- viii. no significant shift from car to public transport (the majority of trolleybus users would otherwise have travelled by bus or train¹⁵ and the reduction in car trips is only half that in active mode trips¹⁶).
2. According to the predictions made by the Applicants' consultants, introduction of the trolleybus would worsen the public transport offer in several respects:
- i. the public transport frequency from any given stop would be lower (current headway at stops on the A660 is 3 minutes, proposed headway at trolleybus stops, and at bus stops, is 6 minutes)¹⁷,
 - ii. the overall public transport seating capacity (measured as number of seats provided per hour) would be reduced¹⁸,
 - iii. almost all bus journeys would take longer door-to-door than they currently do¹⁹,
 - iv. door-to-door journey times by trolleybus would be longer than they currently are by bus for many journeys in the A660 corridor²⁰,
 - v. passengers would, on average, have further to walk (a simple consequence that the average distance between trolley stops would be greater than that between existing bus stops) .
 - vi. origins and destinations on bus routes #1 and #6 which are not directly served by the trolleybus would have a reduced service (notably #1 beyond Bodington Fields and between Hunslet and Beeston, #6 in Cookridge/Tinshill and between the Merrion Centre and the Bus station)²¹,
 - vii. interchange between trolleybus and bus would be less easy than it currently is between bus and bus (due to separation of stops – consider for example the journey from Leeds City station to Adel which is currently effected by transferring from #1 to #28 at Headingley Arndale Centre)²².
3. The impact on economic activity is likely to be negative because, as noted at A.1.v above, introduction of the trolleybus would result in reduced connectivity. The prediction by the Urban Dynamic Model (UDM) that there would be a *positive* impact on employment does not fit this expectation. Closer examination reveals that this is because the UDM treated an assumed willingness to pay to ride on trolleybuses as if it were a real time saving, and because it ignored:

¹⁴ Paras 14.209-211 of C-1 indicate negative impact on heritage assets although Para 14.213 apparently suggests that, over time, this would cease to matter because people would get used to the new situation!

¹⁵ Table 12.4 in C-1

¹⁶ Section C15 of NWLTF122 - original data from letter from AECOM to NWLTF (reproduced as NWLTF112).

¹⁷ Para 11.22 of C-1

¹⁸ The Promoters envisage 8 fewer buses per hour. FWY144 indicates that each bus has 72 seats so this implies a loss of 576 bus seats per hour. This would be offset by an increase of up to 440 seats on trolleybuses – assuming the stated peak frequency of 11 vehicles per hour and assuming 40 seats per trolleybus (a value which, according to evidence in section C7 of NWLTF122, cannot be exceeded if space is to be preserved for the anticipated peak loading). The net effect would therefore be a loss of 136 seats during the peak hour.

¹⁹ Section C2 of NWLTF122 – original data from Appendix A of C-1-13

²⁰ Section C3 of NWLTF122, using data from Appendix A of C-1-13, demonstrates this for journeys from West Park to Merrion Centre. It is also true for journeys to the St John's Centre, The Victoria Quarter, the Grand Theatre, West Yorkshire Playhouse, Leeds bus station, the new Victoria Gate development and indeed to much of the city centre. The effect is even more marked for journeys which do not need to pass through Headingley

²¹ Compare NGT route map with routes of buses #1 and #6. E.g. on Metro's website -

http://www.wymetro.com/uploadedFiles/WYMetro/Content/BusTravel/maps_and_guides/Leeds_Route_Map.pdf

²² See B114.2 in NWLTF122

- i. the increased time and cost suffered by cars and commercial vehicles²³,
- ii. the costs and disruption to business during construction²⁴.

B. Are the revenue forecasts reliable?

1. The revenue forecast relies on some very controversial assumptions all of which will tend to have exaggerated the trolleybus revenues. Namely:
 - i. That people would choose to travel on a trolleybus rather than on a bus or a train even if, ceteris paribus, the trolleybus took 5.5 minutes longer (or cost about 15 pence more) than the bus or train²⁵. This assumption, which is in addition to assumptions about the superiority of boarding point facilities discussed at B.1.iii below, was said to be justified by the results of Stated Preference (SP) work conducted in Leeds. However the SP surveys had actually shown a marginal reluctance to travel on trolleybuses²⁶ and the 5.5 minute value was actually derived from people's willingness to pay to travel on a "very new bus" rather than on an "old bus"²⁷!
 - ii. That people's assumed preference to travel on trolleybuses would exist in perpetuity²⁸. This was assumed despite the fact that, as noted above, the Leeds SP work had shown a strong preference for new vehicles and that, during the life of the project, it is reasonable to assume that there would be times when the bus fleet is newer than the trolleybus fleet.
 - iii. That, over and above the 5.5 minute preference discussed above, the superior quality of facilities at the trolleybus boarding points would mean that people would be prepared to use trolleybuses even if a bus or train was cheaper and quicker. The average value of this assumed preference was 5.8 minutes for buses²⁹ and 8.1 minutes for train³⁰. The average values of the total assumed preference for trolleybus over bus and rail are thus 11.3 (5.5+5.8) and 13.6 (5.5+8.1) minutes respectively. It should be noted that:
 - a. The boarding point quality factors were derived from the Leeds SP work and are significantly higher than values typically found in research elsewhere³¹.

²³ Table 7 of C-1-9 indicates increased time and distance for road based traffic. Paragraphs 3.6 to 3.11 of C-1-18 describe the travel costs which were input to the UDM but contain no reference to the increased car costs. Mr Chadwick confirmed, under cross-examination, that the UDM forecasts ignored the increases in the generalised costs of road-based traffic.

²⁴ Mr Chadwick confirmed, under cross examination that the effects of disruption during construction on generalised costs of travel had not been estimated (and so cannot have been included in the inputs to the UDM).

²⁵ Value confirmed for bus in answer 3 in APP103, the fact that it was also applied to trains was confirmed by Mr Hanson under cross-examination. A similar preference was effectively assumed for travelling on trolleybuses rather than by car or active mode but the precise magnitude is difficult to quantify (it is a function of the composite cost passed through the nests in the hierarchical model of mode choice).

²⁶ This fact was not revealed in any of the documentation sent to DfT. Nor was it revealed to the Inquiry until it was documented in APP155 (Table 1 indicates that the willingness to pay to travel on a trolleybus rather than on a bus is minus 2.76 pence).

²⁷ Under cross examination, Mr Chadwick justified the use of the preference for new buses over old buses to represent an assumed preference for trolleybuses on the grounds that it was the promoters' aspiration that trolleybuses would be perceived as being that much better than buses. He was unable to quote any other support for the assumption. See further discussion in B21 of NWLTF122.

²⁸ Answer 3 in APP103 confirmed that the same penalty was applied in 2031 as in 2016

²⁹ Combining answers 1 and 2 in APP103, we have 7.1 minus 1.3 = 5.8

³⁰ Combining the answer given in APP172 with answer 2 from APP103, we have 9.4 minus 1.3= 8.1.

³¹ A comparison of the values derived from the Leeds SP work with those derived from work elsewhere was provided for DfT (and is reproduced in C-2-4) but it was misleading in that it compared an average of the

- b. A possible reason for the unusually high values placed on the provision of CCTV and lighting at boarding points may be that the Leeds SP survey was conducted in winter shortly after national media coverage of a series of serious assaults, including a murder, at bus stops.
- c. The penalty used to represent paucity of facilities at rail stations was chosen without any study of the facilities actually available (it was apparently thought safe to assume that an “intermediate” value would be appropriate³²). Subsequent investigation of facilities at stations close to the NGT route indicates that, even assuming the Leeds SP values to be correct, the penalty is much higher than can be justified³³.
- iv. That people would have no aversion to having to stand on the trolleybus (SP studies generally indicate that passengers have a strong aversion to standing and, although the Leeds SP work showed this effect³⁴ and although a significant proportion of trolleybus passengers would have to stand³⁵, this was not allowed for in the mode choice model). If passengers’ aversion to standing had been allowed for it would have more than offset the assumed the “benefit” from improved facilities at bus stops³⁶.
- v. That all trolleybus passengers would be able to board the first trolley to arrive at a given stop (a goal which would not be achievable in practice)³⁷.

Leeds values with a maximum of the other values. Section C6 of NWLTF122 indicates that the Leeds values are about double those found elsewhere.

³² Stated in para 4.10 of C-2-8 and confirmed by Mr Chadwick under cross-examination.

³³ See section C12 in NWLTF122

³⁴ The Leeds SP revealed a disinclination to stand but it was somewhat lower than that generally found – probably because the survey sample had excluded concessionary travellers who choose to travel outside the morning peak period – see C8 of NWLTF122.

³⁵ No decision has yet been taken on the internal configuration of the trolleybus vehicles but APP108 indicates some possibilities ranging from “NGT1” (capacity 120 of whom 60 could be seated) to “NGT3” (capacity 160, of whom 40 could be seated). The promoters indicate that, if NGT1 were selected, then 10% of passenger minutes would be spent without a seat. However, as is demonstrated in section C7 of NWLTF122, an analysis of predicted demand profiles shows that, to ensure that capacity is available to meet average demand during the busiest 15 minute periods at the busiest stops, NGT3 would have to be selected. This implies fewer seats and would result in passengers having to stand at most times of day and a majority would have to stand at the busiest times.

³⁶ DfT’s AECOM review of soft factors indicated, on page 191, that having a seat was the most important public transport attribute in all the studies which examined it. As noted above, section C8 of NWLTF122 indicates that the Leeds SP values for crowding are out of line with research elsewhere. Values quoted by the DfT review from studies in Dublin and in Australia suggest that not having a seat would reduce the journey utility by about 65 pence (see Section C8 of NWLTF122). An analysis of predicted demand and available seating (see section C7 of NWLTF122) shows that there would be no spare seats available for passengers boarding at stops along much of the route at most times of day. The passengers’ perception is therefore likely to be that crowding is to be expected on most journeys. If we assume that they expect not to get a seat on half of their journeys we should divide the 65p by two. This gives an average penalty of 32 pence which, when translated in to minutes using the value of time used in the original work, gives a penalty of 13.3 minutes – which is significantly greater than the 5.8 minute advantage associated with superior facilities at boarding points. The consultants suggest a different way of looking at the perception of seat availability – namely the percentage of passenger hours which would be travelled without a seat. Figures for NGT3, provided in Table 1 of APP108, indicate that about 22.5% of trolleybus passenger hours would be without a seat in 2016 – rising to 26.5% in 2031. Dividing the 65 pence by an average of these two gives a penalty of about 16 pence which equates to 6.6 minutes. Even this lower figure more than outweighs the 5.8 minute average benefit which was assumed to come from trolleybus stops having better facilities than those at bus stops.

³⁷ Calculations in Section C7 of NWLTF122 show that the predicted demand would, at some points, exceed the legal maximum capacity of trolleybuses (160) and that it is unrealistic to imagine that this can be overcome by running extra vehicles at these times. It is thus inevitable that some would-be passengers would be

- vi. That car drivers would choose to use the trolleybus park and ride sites (and thus contribute revenue to the trolleybuses) rather than drive into the city centre even if, ceteris paribus, use of the park and ride sites increased their door to door travel time by an hour³⁸.
 - vii. That the bus operator would not make a serious and sustained attempt to compete with the trolleybus³⁹. For example by:
 - a. maintaining frequencies (a sensitivity test of the consequences of bus frequencies simply being maintained suggested that this would reduce trolleybus revenues by 4%⁴⁰ but the main appraisal assumes that this would not happen)
 - b. cutting fares (this assumption was not even subject to a sensitivity test – despite the fact that bus operators’ willingness to cut fares in order to gain market share is already evident from the £1 fares from the Arndale Centre to the University)⁴¹
 - c. introducing the newest, most comfortable, buses on the #1 and #6 routes (again, this assumption was not even subject to a sensitivity test)⁴²
 - d. taking steps to reduce dwell times - for example through greater use of cashless fares (again, this assumption this assumption was not even subject to a sensitivity test)
2. It appears that no tests of the sensitivity of the revenue forecasts to these dubious assumptions have been conducted but it is clear that their replacement by more reasonable/evidence-based assumptions would seriously reduce the predicted revenue for the trolleybus⁴³.
 3. A precise estimate of the implications for revenue is impossible without access to the models but, given the impact of the above factors on generalised costs, it would be unsafe to assume that patronage would be more than half that forecast in the Business Case⁴⁴. If patronage

denied access to the first trolleybus to arrive (thereby increasing waiting times and reducing the attractiveness of the trolleybus relative to other modes).

³⁸ This is because the car parking model has large negative Alternative-Specific Constants (ASCs). The carpark-specific penalty for city centre parks is around zero (see para 4.5.1.3 and Figure 11 in C-1-3) while that for the park and ride sites is minus 70 minutes (Mr Hanson confirmed, under cross-examination, that the Bodington and Stourton Park and Ride sites were assumed to be as attractive as the rail based park and ride sites at Garforth and Pudsey and that they were therefore given an ASC of minus 70 minutes based on the average ASC for those two sites - see para 4.5.1.1 and table 15 in C-1-3). In fact, as argued in the first bullet of section B3.2 in NWLTF122, there is good reason to suggest that a trolleybus-based P&R service would be perceived as less attractive than ones based on rail.

³⁹ Para 3.45 of Webtag Unit 3.15.3 (Inquiry doc E-3-22) notes the need to allow for the effects of competition from existing operators. It recommends including likely effects in the main forecast and using sensitivity testing to explore other effects. Sensitivity tests are detailed in C-1-9, in APP-5-3 and in APP-7-3 but no test of the effect of a reduction in bus fares, of introducing new buses, or of reducing dwell times, is mentioned there or anywhere else in the evidence.

⁴⁰ See result for “High Competition” in Table 9 in C-1-9.

⁴¹ The modelling has assumed that trolleybus fares would be similar to those on buses – see C-1-6.

⁴² The modelling has assumed that, in the trolleybus scenario, the bus service would be provided by buses of a type which was “current” in 2009. The Leeds SP work indicated that passengers would have perceived a significant benefit if the bus service were provided by “new buses” rather than by the then “current” buses.

⁴³ If the aspiration-based 5.5 minute preference for trolleybuses were replaced by a more reasonable figure, if passengers’ aversion to standing were allowed for, and if a more accurate indication of rail qualities were allowed for, the trolleybus would have little or no “quality advantage” over other modes and it would have to compete solely on the basis of the journey time differential, hampered by the fact that people would know that they would often have no seat if they used the trolleybus.

⁴⁴ If trolleybus patronage were halved (but if its services remain as planned), people could be fairly sure of getting a seat on the trolleybus and so the advantage of the superior boarding point facilities would no longer be negated by the aversion to crowding and so a reduction to less than half is unlikely.

were halved but trolleybus service levels were maintained at planned levels⁴⁵, the annual revenue would fall from £16.02m⁴⁶ to around £8m while annual costs would remain around £7.41⁴⁷. An annual revenue surplus of less than £0.59 would not even cover the interest on the £35m of the “prudential borrowing” which is required to help finance the trolleybus project.

4. Given the importance of the revenue issue, the consultants should, as a matter of urgency, be asked to produce a run of the model in which the assumptions listed in section B.1 are replaced by more realistic ones. Namely, a run with:
 - i. the trolleybus’s 5.5 minute quality advantage set to zero,
 - ii. the bus and trolleybus boarding point penalties reduced to 3.5 and 0.6 respectively⁴⁸,
 - iii. the rail boarding point penalty reduced from 9.4 minutes to 2.1 minutes⁴⁹,
 - iv. a penalty added to trolleybus trips to represent the likelihood of crowding (an accurate representation of crowding would not be possible without further model development but a proxy could be applied via an average penalty based on average loadings at a given time of day. An average figure of 6.6 minutes would seem fair⁵⁰),
 - v. bus dwell times reduced by (say) 33% (to reflect faster the boarding times achievable through greater use of cashless fares),
 - vi. the frequency of the #1 and #6 buses kept at their current levels (to compete with trolleybus), and
 - vii. a reduction of (say) 25% in bus fares in the NGT corridor offset by bus fare increases in the rest of the network (to compete with trolleybus while maintaining overall bus revenues).

C. What implications would local control of buses (via a Quality Bus Contract or as part of a devolution agreement) have for the Trolleybus project?

1. Part of the rationale for selecting trolleybus as the NGT vehicle was that it enabled the promoters to apply for a Transport Works Act Order (TWAO). This was thought desirable because it would give the promoter control of the services and allow them to keep the revenues. The revenues on the A660 are particularly attractive and explain why that corridor was selected for the trolleybus. A Quality Bus Contract (QBC), or the powers for devolved authorities trailed in the 2015 Queen’s Speech, would give the Combined Authority (WYCA) control of bus services and would allow them to keep any surplus revenues.
2. Given control of bus services, WYCA could rationalise bus services to make sure that the buses did not compete with it. However, if the Combined Authority had control of revenues, any financial case for introducing a trolleybus would disappear because the increased costs of providing public transport would exceed the expected increase in total public transport revenues. Introduction of NGT would thus result in an ongoing drain in the resources available

⁴⁵ If services were cut to reduce costs, the problem of seat shortage would re-emerge and the equilibrium demand level would fall further.

⁴⁶ Table 12.14 in C-1 shows annual revenues of £16.02m.

⁴⁷ Table 11.3 in C-1 identifies £5.41m annual operating cost while para 11.35 in C-1 identifies £2m annual infrastructure maintenance costs.

⁴⁸ Reflecting the fact that the analysis presented in section C6 of NWLTF122 suggested that the penalties derived from the Leeds SP work were about double those found elsewhere.

⁴⁹ A figure of 4.2 minutes is justified in section C12 of NWLTF122 but this should be halved in order to reflect the recommended halving of the equivalent penalties for bus and trolleybus.

⁵⁰ Based on calculations in footnote 32 above

for public transport. The scale of this annual drain on resources can be calculated in various ways^{51,52,53} but is likely to be around £3m per annum.

D. Were the performance and impacts of the trolleybus scheme accurately modelled?

1. There are serious concerns about the use, within the mode choice model, of quality factors whose values are not supported by evidence. Specifically:
 - i. The assumption, despite contrary evidence from the Leeds SP study, that people would prefer to travel on a trolleybus than on any other public transport vehicle (see B.1.i above),
 - ii. The use of boarding-point quality factors which are considerably higher than those found elsewhere (see footnote 27 above),
 - iii. The use of unjustifiably high penalty factors for use of rail (see B.1.i and B.1.iii.c above).
2. There are serious concerns about the failure to consider the limits on the capacity of trolleybus vehicles⁵⁴. The models represent traffic congestion and of crowding on rail services but have no representation of crowding or seat availability on buses or trolleybuses. The failure to consider crowding on buses may be justified by the fact that, in an incremental demand model, it is unnecessary to represent a continuation of a pre-existing condition. Also, although it may be assumed that extra buses would be deployed if demand were to exceed supply, this assumption is not realistic for trolleybuses (see section C7 of NWLTF122). Given passengers' well-known aversion to standing, the failure to consider the practical limits on trolleybus capacity limits on the carrying is a serious flaw.
3. There are concerns about the accuracy of the traffic assignment model. For example:
 - i. The representation of the A660/Shaw Lane junction appears to be seriously deficient (the flows predicted for the base year are very different from reality⁵⁵). Given that the performance of this junction is critical for the corridor as a whole, it is clearly important that it is correctly represented. Indeed, given that it needs to be coordinated with the junctions at Alma road and North Lane, it would seem appropriate to consider some form of detailed simulation modelling of this part of the network.

⁵¹ Table 21.1 of C-1 indicates a net NGT surplus of £3m p.a. while Table 21.3 indicates a net loss to bus operators of £6.3m. This indicates a net loss for the combined (bus + NGT) service of around £3.3m p.a. If rail services are included in the equation then the net loss is greater because, while there would be little opportunity to reduce rail costs, rail revenues are likely to fall by around £1.3m p.a. (Table 12.14 of C-1 shows that about 8.5% of NGT trips would have been abstracted from rail, 8.5% of the £16.02m NGT revenue is £1.35m). This suggests an annual loss for all public transport services of £4.6m.

⁵² The annual cost of providing bus and NGT services would be about £7.5m greater than that of providing bus services alone. This figure comprises £4.15m net increase in operating costs (see Table 11.3 of C-1), around £2m for NGT infrastructure maintenance (see para 11.35 of C-1) and around £1.4m to service the £35m debt. This £7.5m is of course offset by increased revenues but, even accepting the (arguably inflated) revenues presented in Table 12.14 of C-1, this is likely to be less than £4m p.a. (Table 12.14 shows that around 75% of NGT trips would have been abstracted from other modes of public transport. If the 25% that are genuinely new are assumed to contribute 25% of the predicted £16.02m annual revenue, then the extra revenue is only £4m p.a.). This indicates a net loss of around £3.5m p.a. (£7.5m minus £4m).

⁵³ Table 21.3 in C-1 shows that non-NGT public transport revenues would fall by £8.3m. The forecast revenue for trolleybus is shown, in table 12.14, as £16.02m. £16.02 minus £8.3 is £7.72 which is similar to the £7.5m of additional cost calculated in footnote 48 above but, as argued in B.3 above, there is good reason to believe that trolleybus revenues would be substantially less than £16.02m p.a.

⁵⁴ See section D2 of NWLTF122.

⁵⁵ See C11 of NWLTF122 and original data from APP103

- ii. The inaccurate representation of turning movements at the A660/Shaw Lane junction and of the flows on rat-runs such as Moor Road and Weetwood Lane⁵⁶, indicates that the model cannot be relied on to show the effects of the scheme on local traffic.⁵⁷
- 4. There are concerns about the accuracy of the representation of local access links. For example, zone centroid connectors in Headingley are linked into the walk network at locations which will have distorted the predicted usage of individual boarding points and will have tended to exaggerate the accessibility of the trolleybus relative to other public transport modes (most particularly relative to rail and buses #19 and 56)⁵⁸.
- 5. There are serious concerns about the Park and Ride model:
 - i. The fact that attempts to calibrate the parking model resulted in extraordinarily large car-park-specific constants and in the need to employ an unusual “fix” whereby car costs are factored up and public transport costs are factored down⁵⁹.
 - ii. The fact that the predicted demand includes a significant element of reverse-flow traffic (drivers driving out to a P&R site in order to ride back in again) and that the Stourton P&R site apparently fails to attract any users from the Wakefield area⁶⁰.
- 6. There are serious concerns about the Urban Dynamic Model:
 - i. The fact that it has ignored the predicted increases the cost and duration of journeys by car (see footnote 19 above)
 - ii. The fact that its prediction of increased employment is largely⁶¹ due to the quality benefits which, despite evidence from the Leeds SP work, were attributed to travel on trolleybuses.
 - iii. The fact that, because the model looked only at public transport users, it was unable to reflect the fact that overall transport costs (summed over all modes and time periods) are predicted to increase if the trolleybus scheme goes ahead⁶².

E. Is the result of the Cost Benefit Analysis credible?

- 1. There can be little doubt that the “benefit” which produces a positive Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) has been exaggerated:
 - i. About a quarter⁶³, of the “time saving benefit” is derived from the quality factors which were assumed to be associated with use of trolleybus but which, as noted in B.1.i above, are contrary to the results of the Leeds SP study.

⁵⁶ See C14 of NWLTF122 and original data from APP103

⁵⁷ It is accepted that the assignment passed the normal DfT tests but these relate to the network as a whole – the assignment may be acceptable at the strategic level but its inability to represent local traffic must limit its usefulness for detailed analysis of the type required to model impacts of capacity-critical systems such as NGT.

⁵⁸ See Section D1 of NWLTF122 (particularly the bulleted points at the end of section D1.a)

⁵⁹ Mr Hanson conceded, under cross-examination, that the parking model was not as good as he would wish and that its predictions could not be regarded as accurate to within plus or minus 50%. Paragraph 4.5.1.3 of C-1-3, discussing the parking model’s ASCs, concludes that they reflect weakness and inconsistencies in the input data. The use of the “fix” is discussed in paragraph B36 of NWLTF122.

⁶⁰ Data in APP147, discussion in B39 of NWLTF122.

⁶¹ Mr Chadwick accepted, under cross-examination, that about half of the supposed “travel time savings” for public transport users were actually attributable to the quality factors. Calculations in C1 of NWLTF suggest that the contribution may be higher than that.

⁶² See A.1.v above

⁶³ Mr Chadwick accepted, under cross-examination, that about half of the supposed “travel time savings” for public transport users were actually attributable to the quality factors. The total average quality factor is

- ii. A further quarter of the “time saving benefit” is derived from the value placed on the superior facilities to be provided at trolleybus boarding points but there is good reason to believe that too high a value has been placed on these aspects⁶⁴.
 - iii. No allowance has been made for passengers’ well-known aversion to standing. Discussion at B.1.iv above indicates that correct allowance for this aversion would more than outweigh all the benefit assumed to result from the fact that facilities at trolleybus boarding points would be better than those at bus stops.
 - iv. No allowance has been made for the value of the health disbenefits associated with the reduced use of active modes⁶⁵.
 - v. The benefit has not been reduced to allow for a number of other factors which, although difficult to quantify without access to the models, would certainly result in reduced “benefit” in the BCR. For example:
 - a. delays to trolleybus passengers unable to board the first vehicle to arrive (likely to occur sometimes even with “NGT3” and inevitable if, in an attempt to provide more than the minimum number of seats, trolleybus capacities are lower than 160),
 - b. loss of passenger utility caused by any reduction in the provision of bus services other than the #1 and #6 due to loss of revenues to trolleybus (services #28, #92 and #97 are perhaps most obviously at risk).
 - vi. Correction of these deficiencies would reduce the contribution of “quality” benefits to about zero and thus reduce the estimate of overall benefit by about 50%. This would result in a BCR of about 1.5⁶⁶.
2. The calculation of wider benefits which, although not included in the calculation of the Benefit Cost Ratio, are relied on in the Business Case. They are exaggerated in that:
- i. They exclude the loss in value of the heritage/landscape assets which would be adversely affected by the scheme (despite recent DfT guidance indicating that this impact should be included)⁶⁷.
 - ii. They include a benefit attributed to reduced journey time variability which is exaggerated because it was calculated for the in-vehicle part of the journey rather than for the full door-to door journey⁶⁸.
 - iii. They include the assumed increase in employment predicted by the UDM (see D6 above).
3. The baseline used to calculate the benefits (the Do Minimum Scenario) is unduly pessimistic in that:
- i. it does not allow for the value which, according to the Leeds SP study, people put on travelling on new buses (it was, in effect, assumed that, if NGT does not proceed, the route would for ever be served by buses which were the norm in 2009⁶⁹).

11.3 minutes (see B.1.iii above). The disputed 5.5 minutes is about half (5.5/11.3) of this total. Thus the disputed figure is about a quarter of the total benefit.

⁶⁴ As noted at B.1.iiia above.

⁶⁵ Recent DfT guidance indicates that this effect should be allowed for and section C17 of NWLTF122 estimates that it could be a disbenefit of up to £4.2m).

⁶⁶ APP-7-3.2 shows benefits of £438m and costs of £151m. Removing the contribution from “quality” would reduce benefit to about £220m giving a BCR of 1.45. However, a more accurate estimate would require a re-run of the models – use of the run recommended at B.4 above would be an obvious first step.

⁶⁷ See section C16 of NWLTF122.

⁶⁸ See discussion in para B69 of NWLTF122.

⁶⁹ 2009 was the date of the SP survey.

- ii. it assumes:
 - a. very modest improvement in the quality of rail travel (despite on-going initiatives)
 - b. no significant improvement in bus stop facilities (despite there being a Metro policy of continued improvements)
 - c. no saving in bus boarding time associated with roll-out of smart ticketing (which is already underway)
- 4. The deficiencies in the Leeds Transport Model (see D above) will, on balance, have resulted in forecasts which were unduly favourable to the scheme.
- 5. The net effect of the above will have been to exaggerate the net benefits of the “Preferred Alternative” (PA) scheme. It seems reasonable to assume that correction of all the above would leave the estimated BCR well below 1.5 (note that the 2012 DfT approval letter⁷⁰ indicates that approval of the Final Business Case is contingent on the BCR not falling substantially below 2.7).

F. Were alternative solutions properly investigated?

1. Neither the “Next Best Alternative” (NBA) nor the “Low Cost Alternative” (LCA) are serious attempts to show what could be achieved by other means if there were a will to do so⁷¹. As such they are constructs of little value.
 - i. Given that the NBA has no identified source of funding, it has no more relevance than any other unfunded scheme. It would have been much more useful to have shown what could be achieved by, for example, significant investment in rail-based Park and Ride and/or tram-train investment, combined with enhanced bus priority and minor traffic management measures in the NGT corridor.
 - ii. Notwithstanding the above, it is clearly useful to be aware of the likely performance of alternatively-powered vehicles using the trolleybus alignment. Unsurprisingly, because it requires similar infrastructure and has its own set of stops separate from bus stops, the NBA produces almost all the same disbenefits as the trolleybus⁷². It is predicted to attract fewer passengers than trolleybus because it has been assumed that it would be less attractive to potential passengers. However, this assumption is highly questionable (there is nothing in the results of the Leeds SP work to warrant it) and a sensitivity test⁷³ shows that, if it were perceived as the trolleybus is assumed to be, it would achieve a BCR of 3.49 (which is greater than the 2.90 predicted for the PA).
 - iii. The LCA was very poorly specified:
 - a. The bus priority measures which were specified give no significant reduction in bus run times. No attempt appears to have been made to consider additional bus priority measures (and those measures which were included give, inexplicably, less benefit in the LCA than they do in the PA⁷⁴).
 - b. Given that the Leeds SP showed that improvements to bus stops would be very cost effective, the LCA should have included very significant investment in such

⁷⁰ See condition iii of the July 2012 Programme Entry Approval letter – C-6-15.

⁷¹ This was clearly stated by Mr Chadwick several times during his evidence and cross examination. See Section D5 of NWLTF122 for a fuller discussion of the consideration that was given to alternatives.

⁷² The main difference would be that the particular costs and aesthetic disbenefits associated with the use of trolleybus technology would be avoided.

⁷³ The “full quality” NBA test reported in APP-7-3.5

⁷⁴ See Section C4 in NWLTF122

improvements. However the assumed improvement is limited⁷⁵ (and, inexplicably, the unit costs of improvements appear to be assumed to be higher in the LCA than in the PA⁷⁶).

- c. Give that the Leeds SP showed that passengers would perceive significant benefit from the introduction of new buses, the LCA should have allowed for the introduction of new buses rather than the continued use of old diesel engine stock.
- d. The traffic signal settings devised for the PA were assumed to be employed in the LCA – they were not optimised for the LCA and so under-estimate what could be achieved in terms of network performance in a LCA scenario⁷⁷.
- e. The possibility of improvements in traffic management in the centre of Headingley (around North Lane) has been ignored⁷⁸.
- f. No improvement in bus boarding times has been allowed for (despite the clear potential for this via improved ticketing, use of smart cards and, potentially, of buses with multiple doors and two staircases).
- g. The rail stock has been assumed to remain unimproved.

⁷⁵ Answer 1 in APP103 shows that the bus stop penalty in the LCA is, at 5.4, only slightly lower than that in the Do Minimum case – whereas, as reported in answer 2, the penalty for trolleybus stops is reduced to 1.3.

⁷⁶ Answer 7 in APP103 reveals that £2.96m was assumed to be required to improve 52 bus stops in the LCA while £0.5m was thought sufficient to cover replacement of 66 bus stops in the PA.

⁷⁷ See para B60 in NWLTF122 – referring back to para 2.31 of REB-OBJ1719.3

⁷⁸ A discussion document outlining such improvements, and public opinions regarding them, has been produced by NWLTF and appears on their website:

<http://www.nwlftf.org.uk/docs/ngt/Alternative%20Transport%20Strategy%20discussion%20doc.pdf>

Submission of the A660 Joint Council to Scrutiny Board (City Development)

By : Vice Chairman Bill McKinnon

Date : Tuesday 8th November 2016

Subject : Transport for Leeds - Supertram, NGT and Beyond

1. Response to Report of Director of City Development and WYCA dated 7 September 2016

- a. Paragraph 2.1 states that Alistair Darling refused to fund Supertram on the grounds of affordability. The National Audit Office report into the failure of the Supertram scheme published in 2006 states at page 13:

"The promoters presented the Department with the results of their work which they began in February. The promoters proposed to defer construction of the 7km southern stretch to Tingley and revised the allocation of risk to bring costs down. They benchmarked costs against other UK light rail schemes, concluding that costs in Leeds were higher because of higher land prices and because Supertram had more on-street running than other schemes and passed through environmentally- sensitive areas."

The promoters were in effect admitting that a contributing factor to the high cost of Supertram was the cost of the land they'd purchased along the A660.

- b. Paragraph 3.3.3 states, *"The Benefits of NGT were documented in the Business Case which was scrutinised in detail and approved by the DfT"* And paragraph 3.3.5 states *"It is clear from this analysis that the Leeds economy would have received a significant and positive economic benefit from NGT."* But the DfT said that its conclusions were based on assumptions made by the promoters which if incorrect, would invalidate the conclusions. The inspector examined the assumptions and found them to be unsound.
- c. One of NGT's stated objectives was to *"Reduce transport emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases."* But the scheme would have increased such emissions. The failure to meet this important objective concerned the inspector. But paragraph 3.3.8 tries to belittle the inspector's concern and the failure of the scheme to meet an important objective by saying that the scheme would have had only *"minor adverse impacts on air quality."*
- d. NGT would have passed through ten conservation areas. The promoters consistently downplayed the damage that would be caused to these areas, even to the extent of photoshopping leaves onto trees and adding blue skies with fluffy white clouds to make the "after" images look better than the "before" images. This downplaying of the damage continues in the report presented to you on the 7th September, which suggests at paragraphs 3.3.9, 3.3.10 and 3.3.11 that the damage was blown out of proportion by *"a relatively small but significant vocal local opposition"* and a gullible inspector.
- e. Regarding the *"relatively small but significant vocal opposition"* to the scheme. The DfT received 1,880 formal objections to the scheme. An online poll of over 7,000 Yorkshire Evening Post readers found that over 70% considered the scheme would be bad for Leeds, and a survey of almost 2,000 Yorkshire Evening Post readers found that just 24% supported the scheme. In addition, the scheme was opposed by the Federation of Small Businesses. With regards to bodies such as Leeds University which supported the scheme, the inspector said that their support was for general transport improvements and did not constitute support for any specific scheme.
- f. Paragraph 3.5.8 states, *"Whilst the DfT process of scrutiny was rigorous in respect of the business case, it is less clear how the process related to overall scheme deliverability, or the reasons why the Planning Inspector was able to have formed an 'expert' view on the business*

case without the detailed technical background." The inspector didn't claim to have formed an 'expert' view. Like any judge, he listened to the experts on both sides, and concluded from what he heard that the expert evidence provided by the promoters was unreliable.

- g. Paragraph 3.5.8 also states, "*There appeared to be a disconnect between the Inspector and the DfT on the assessment of scheme benefits. This is despite the extensive technical rigour and scrutiny that had been applied by DfT and others through the course of the scheme's development.*" As already stated, the DfT made clear that its decision to give provisional support for the scheme was based on assumptions made by the promoters in their business case. These assumptions were shown at the inquiry to be very likely incorrect.
- h. Paragraph 3.5.8 blames the DfT for the promoters' decision to drop the eastern leg of the project. But the decision to drop it was the promoters. And the DfT advice to drop the eastern leg was based on data supplied by the promoters.
- i. Paragraph 3.5.8 states that the inquiry process needs to be quicker. But the reason this inquiry was so long was because there was so much that was wrong with the promoters' business case. This was borne out by the inspector's conclusions, which form an 80 page list of criticisms of the scheme.
- j. Paragraph 4.1.1 claims that there was extensive consultation on the trolleybus scheme from 2008 onwards. And yet the decision to pursue the trolleybus scheme was made by Metro in November 2006 under the chairmanship of Bradford trolleybus enthusiast Stanley King. This was long before any consultation. And at no stage in the consultation process were people asked if they wanted a trolleybus.

The NGT information leaflets released in the Autumn and Winter of 2012 and Spring 2013 stated "*modern trolleybus systems are an increasingly common sight in European and North American cities.*" In fact, trolleybus numbers in North America decreased from 1,926 in the year 2000, to 1,312 in 2012, a drop of 32% in 12 years. In Europe, numbers decreased from 6,375 in 2000, to 4,828 in 2012, a drop of 24% in 12 years. Despite the misinformation given to the public, it's clear that the results of the consultation were negative as Metro refused to publish them or include them with their application to the DfT for a Transport and Works Act Order. Instead, Metro included with its application, quotes from bodies such as the Civic Trust, which supported the application.

- k. The report of the Director of City Development and WYCA dated 7 September 2016 seeks to shift blame for the failure of Supertram and NGT away from the promoters and onto Alistair Darling, the inspector and objectors.

2. Reasons for the failure of Supertram and NGT

- a. Supertram failed because it was too expensive. A contributory factor to the scheme's high cost was the cost of all the land that had been purchased along the A660. The National Audit Office report published in 2006 reveals that the promoters gave this as a reason for the scheme's high cost.
- b. NGT failed for the following reasons (and others) given by the Secretary of State for Transport on 12 May 2016:
 - 1. The scheme would deliver improvements to a relatively small part of Leeds and could result in poorer public transport services in other parts of the city.
 - 2. There is little evidence to show that the scheme would serve the most deprived areas of Leeds.

3. The scheme would harm the built and natural environment as a result of the introduction of over-head wires, additional street clutter, and the loss of trees and green spaces.
4. The scheme would not significantly improve access to jobs because of the fewer stops provided, the limited locations it would serve and the relatively poor integration with other public transport.
5. Because the trolley vehicles would share significant sections of the route with other traffic, they could be vulnerable to congestion and other delays making journey times less reliable than predicted by the applicants.
6. The likely high proportion of people having to stand in peak times would be a deterrent to passengers.
7. Surveys indicate a strong preference for new double-decker buses over articulated vehicles or trolleybuses.
8. The scheme would do little to make the route more attractive for cyclists and would result in insufficient improvements in pedestrian facilities and safety to encourage walking.
9. The scheme would not be fully integrated with other public transport as trolley vehicles would not use the same stops as buses and would not access the bus station.
10. By taking patronage from existing buses the scheme would compromise the commercial sustainability and efficient use of the existing bus service.
11. The method used by the applicants to make patronage forecasts for the scheme based on the Stated Preference survey results does not inspire confidence.
12. The demand for the proposed park and ride sites has been over-estimated.
13. The over-head wiring cannot be regarded as a positive feature that could influence investment decisions in the area by its appearance of permanence.
14. The applicants have not properly taken into account evidence that other forms of technology are progressing or that trolley vehicle technology has not been widely adopted in recent years.
15. The promoters have given insufficient weight to the environmental harm caused by over-head wiring compared with other modes of propulsion.
16. The applicants have not fully examined whether there are more suitable corridors for a rapid transit system to meet the scheme's objectives.
17. The policy support for the scheme at national and local level has to be weighed against the harm which the scheme would cause to heritage assets, green space and biodiversity which contravene other national and local policies.
18. The impact of the scheme in operation on overall air quality including carbon emissions would be negative due to the impact on other traffic and the use of grid electricity.
19. The over-head line equipment would be more extensive than for trams and is likely to have an adverse effect on the character and appearance of buildings and their setting
20. The viability of some businesses is likely to be harmed by implementation of the scheme.
21. There would be a reduction in the overall area of open space as a result of the scheme, some of which is difficult to justify against the likely benefits of the scheme.
22. The need to separate trolleybus stops from other bus stops would make it less convenient for people to use public transport
23. Because the scheme is predicted to take much of its patronage from existing bus services, it could result in a reduction in bus services in the corridor and elsewhere.
24. If bus operators competed with the trolleybus, this could threaten the viability of the scheme.
25. Congestion would not be improved by the scheme, with some junctions having greater queue lengths and an increase in the overall distance travelled annually by cars.

26. The reduction of parking and other traffic restrictions along the corridor could affect the viability of businesses.
27. Parts of the route would be shared with pedestrians which would result in either trolley vehicles not being able to travel at their design speeds or else a risk to pedestrian safety.
28. Cycling facilities were not a priority in designing the scheme and some design standards have been compromised in favour of motor vehicles and trolley vehicles, putting the safety of cyclists at risk.
29. The A660 corridor is not particularly suitable for articulated vehicles.
30. The scale of standing by passengers on the trolley vehicles would be a safety concern.
31. There would be significant adverse impacts on heritage assets and the loss of mature trees and open space along the route.
32. The loss of trees, green space and the impact on the historic environment would not be adequately mitigated.
33. Any beneficial impacts on the character and appearance of areas to the south of the route would not compensate for the severe harm to the character and appearance of conservation areas and listed buildings in the north.
34. The Business Case should have included a monetised estimate for construction phase impacts, which are likely to be significant.
35. The assumed journey times are optimistic and there is insufficient evidence to substantiate them.
36. Insufficient detail has been given to verify the applicants' cost estimates and to provide assurance that they are unlikely to be exceeded.
37. There is a realistic possibility that the scheme would not attract the necessary funding to maintain it, even with the commitment that has been made to fund its construction should the Order be made.
38. On the basis of the evidence submitted to the inquiry, there is a significant degree of uncertainty about whether the scheme would be operationally viable.
39. There may be cheaper options requiring less compulsory purchase of land that would be more effective in addressing the aims and objectives of the scheme.

3. Beyond

- a. Air quality in Leeds is acknowledged to be amongst the worst in the UK. It's essential therefore that any schemes undertaken in the future, provide significant improvements to air quality.
- b. Any future schemes should be either environmentally neutral or improve the quality of our built and natural environment.
- c. Any future schemes should adhere to the principles of the Hierarchy of Road Users.
- d. For the above reasons, the A660 Joint Council is opposed to the proposals for the A660 put forward by Professor Peter Bonsall on behalf of the North West Leeds Transport Forum. In addition:
- e. Transport professional Alan Beswick has stated in a report (see Appendix A) that since 90% of the traffic passing through junctions along the A660 is car traffic, Professor Bonsall's proposal to ban right turns at junctions would actually benefit cars far more than it would benefit buses. His report states, *"This is the sort of scheme that does almost exactly the opposite of what it might be thought to be designed to do – to make buses more attractive."* Mr Beswick's report also states, *"Helping cars go faster doesn't help public transport – on the contrary, it will just encourage more traffic to use the A660. (until the point at which the extra traffic wipes out the time benefits that the scheme initially brings).*

- f. Transport academic Andrew Tomlinson of Leeds University's Institute of Transport Studies has stated in his report (see Appendix B):

"This NWLTF proposal attempts to address the congestion at Hyde Park Corner by banning right turns across the junction. However, the proposal does nothing to increase the attractiveness of bus trips relative to car trips, nor does it reduce the road capacity available for car trips through the junction. Indeed the proposal increases capacity for both cars and buses equally, and in all probability given there is a suppressed demand for road trips into Leeds might contribute to making the overall situation worse, by attracting more cars to this junction and consuming the new capacity released by the changes.

"The proposal for Hyde Park Corner is presented by NWLTF as a "modest but nonetheless valuable improvement" (page 2). However, as identified in this document, there are a number of technical issues related to this plan which mean that it is likely to be more difficult and more contentious to implement than is implied in the proposal document. A new section of road would need to be built, other sections widened or narrowed and further junction signalisation would be required."

Mr Tomlinson demonstrates in his report that by banning right turns at Hyde Park Corner, high volumes of traffic would be diverted away from the main roads onto much smaller roads and also onto the new road that the professor proposes building across Woodhouse Moor.

- g. Professor Bonsall's proposals to build a new road across Woodhouse Moor, a cycle path along Woodhouse Ridge, setting back the wall along Headingley Lane, and building a Headingley Bypass for cyclists, are at odds with several of the findings of the trolleybus inspector (see Appendix C)

4. Postscript

The Scrutiny Board may also wish to consider investigating the Electrobus scheme. This was a trolleybus scheme pursued by Metro between 1980 and 1990. Initially it was intended to bring back trolleybuses just to Bradford. But when the government refused to fund the scheme, Metro included Leeds in the scheme, in the hope that by so doing, the scheme would seem more attractive to the government. When the government finally refused to fund the scheme, Metro decided to go ahead with the scheme by itself. But then, when a private bus operator announced that it would be running a diesel bus service along the proposed trolleybus route, Metro dropped the scheme. This was tacit recognition by Metro that trolleybuses can't compete with diesel buses. Metro has destroyed all its records of the Electrobus scheme. This may explain why they put forward NGT on a route where there was already a well-established bus service provided by private bus operators. Their NGT business case unrealistically assumed that these private bus operators wouldn't try to compete with the trolleybus.

APPENDIX A

Comments on NWLTF's Alternative Transport Strategy Discussion Document in Relation to the Headingley Neighbourhood Plan Transport Options Note

CONTEXT

- 1.1 Having previously provided advice on traffic and transport issues to Headingley Network's Transport Group and to the Ash Road Area Residents Association (ARARA)¹ I was asked for an opinion on the draft Headingley Transport Options (HTO) note being prepared for the Headingley Neighbourhood Plan.
- 1.2 Having reviewed that document it appeared that some of the ideas in the North West Leeds Transport Forum (NWLTF) Alternative Transport Strategy Discussion Document were proving very influential. To my mind these created a disconnect between the very locally-specific neighbourhood proposals and the more strategic proposals focused on the A660 corridor. I have been asked by Bill McKinnon of the A660 Joint Council to set out my observations in the form of this short note.
- 1.3 *I should make it clear that I am not commenting on whether the NWLTF proposals are better or worse than the Trolleybus scheme that they have been developed as an alternative to, but on whether these proposals are appropriate for the Headingley Neighbourhood Plan.*

HEADINGLEY TRANSPORT OPTIONS (HTO) EMERGING IDEAS NOTE

- 1.4 It is worth beginning with a quick observation about the objectives, goals and general approach set out in the HTO note, repeated here

General Objective: *To promote access, economic vitality and environmental standards in the Headingley neighbourhood and so enhance the quality of life of its residents and users*

Goals: *To reduce accident risk, noise, pollution and other unwanted effects of traffic and to make it easier to travel to, from, within **and through** Headingley.*

General Approach: *To encourage, wherever possible, the use of public transport and active modes (walking and cycling) rather than cars*
- 1.5 These are all very sensible. Having said that, I have highlighted the '*and through Headingley*' statement in the goals as I would suggest it is worth considering whether that is an essential part of a Neighbourhood Plan, particularly where the general objective is to enhance the quality of life for residents of the neighbourhood. It is however consistent with the ideas that emerge from the NWLTF which as I will show below are focused on improving the position for traffic passing *through* Headingley, but with some consequential adverse impacts on the neighbourhood.
- 1.6 I was initially a little confused when I looked at the Headingley Transport Options note for the HNP. There are many good ideas contained within it that would seem to be exactly the sorts of things a Neighbourhood Plan should be looking at. It is simply a shopping list of ideas but this is quite appropriate for the moment, the document is exactly what it says it is – 'emerging ideas and options' that would require further work in order to develop a strategy.
- 1.7 But amongst these good ideas there is an underlying theme that I found quite surprising. On further investigation I realised that this came from the work by the NWLTF.

¹ I am a director of one of the UK's largest independent transport planning consultancies and have been resident in Headingley for over 35 years.

APPENDIX A

NWLTF PROPOSALS

- 1.8 The NWLTF Alternative Transport Strategy Discussion Document is a preliminary draft which has been offered up by the NWLTF as a discussion document about alternatives to the A660 Trolley Bus scheme (Part A of the document) and as part of a broader discussion on the transport strategy for Leeds City Region (Part B).
- 1.9 I am only commenting on Part A, the A660 proposals, and only in so far as they have been drawn into the Headingley Transport Options note.
- 1.10 There is a general implied intent within the NWLTF report to develop measures that support buses, by amongst other things reducing delays to them on the A660. While this may be the intent it doesn't reflect the fact that the majority of measures proposed are essentially a series of traffic management options designed to reduce delays at junctions, particularly at traffic light controlled junctions. Most of these aim to reduce 'conflicting' movements. Conflicting movements are usually where cars are turning right across the general flow of traffic. Reducing these conflicts generally means that you can increase the straight-ahead flow through a junction.
- 1.11 In removing these conflicting movements you may reduce delays to buses at these junctions but what you primarily achieve is a reduction in delays to cars going straight ahead through the junction.
- 1.12 As cars will make up 90%+ of the vehicles on the A660 it would be disingenuous to claim that such schemes are designed to benefit buses. What they really do is make it easier and faster for cars to get through the junctions. Helping cars go faster doesn't help public transport – on the contrary it will just encourage more traffic to use the A660, (until the point at which the extra traffic wipes out the time 'benefits' that the scheme initially brings).
- 1.13 Furthermore to get rid of these conflicting movements there are several proposals in Part A of the NWLTF report which in the context of a Neighbourhood Plan are highly inappropriate.
- 1.14 The proposal (Option 3 in their report) to reduce the conflicting movements at the North Lane/A660 junction is a good example of this as the scheme requires changes to Bennett Road and St Michaels Road in order to make it work (essentially to provide an alternative route for the traffic that would be banned from turning at the North Lane/A660 junction).
- 1.15 The suggestion that the traffic barrier at Bennett Road (which was closed as a rat run by Leeds City Council in the late 1980) be removed will 'import' passing traffic onto a road which is currently local access only. This idea would seriously worsen conditions for pedestrians on the Otley Road (by Boots) and on North Lane (by the Community Centre) as well as for people using HEART and of course the residents of Bennett Road.
- 1.16 The North Lane/A660 junction scheme also proposes making it easier for eastbound traffic from Kirkstall Lane/North Lane to route via St Michael's Road and past the War Memorial. It is hard to think of a less appropriate road in Headingley to be encouraging more traffic to use it. In fact the proposal to make the western end of St Michael's Road one way eastbound not only encourages more traffic to use this narrow residential street but will also speed up the traffic on the one way section.
- 1.17 Elsewhere the Shaw Lane/A660 junction proposals (Option 12) would add more traffic to Headingley Mount. This road has already borne the brunt of additional traffic as the unavoidable consequence of the Ash Road area-wide traffic calming - to add more traffic onto it in order to improve the flow of traffic down the A660 is arguably adding insult to injury.
- 1.18 This is where it gets difficult to support many of the ideas in the context of a Neighbourhood Plan since, as I've shown above, most of these schemes will result in traffic being diverted onto neighbourhood streets.

APPENDIX A

- 1.19 There are some good ideas within the NWLTF Alternative Transport Strategy in the context of the debate that it is seeking to influence (which is movement along the A660 corridor) but it is dominated by traffic management solutions that are all about maximising the flow of *vehicles* and not *people*.
- 1.20 If you want an example of this then have a look at the suggestion in Option 6 that the bus stop on Cardigan Road near North Lane should be moved out of the main carriageway and into a new bus lay-by to reduce the queues that sometimes back-up behind it. What does this achieve? Firstly it makes the car journey a little quicker. Secondly it makes the bus journey a little slower as the bus then has to look for a break in the traffic to pull out into the road after people have boarded or alighted.
- 1.21 The changes may only be modest but the net result is that public transport has become slightly less attractive, both in absolute terms, and more so in relative terms. Or looked at another way – the 50 to 80 people that will typically be on a bus in the morning rush hour are disadvantaged to allow maybe 10 car drivers who get caught behind a loading bus a few seconds advantage.
- 1.22 This is the sort of scheme that does almost exactly the opposite of what it might be thought to be designed to do - to make buses more attractive. There are plenty more examples. The Hyde Park Corner ideas (Option 17) for instance could have some potentially beneficial impacts in terms of the pedestrian environment outside the Crescent shops but these are almost incidental to the main outcome which is to reduce delays to through traffic (predominantly cars) on the A660.

IN SUMMARY

- 1.23 If the aim of the Neighbourhood Plan is to enhance the environment, vitality and liveability of the area for Headingley residents and businesses then one might take the view that the focus of the transport options should be on the streetscape and the environment for pedestrians and cyclists on their local streets. On the A660 arguably the Neighbourhood Plan focus should be on mitigating its adverse impact on the environment for the shopping and leisure facilities in the centre of Headingley. The best way to do that is likely to be by not increasing highway capacity, in any shape or form, and instead supporting measures that make it easier and safer to walk and to cycle and easier and more attractive to use the bus - more attractive fares, simpler, ticketing, better information and additional bus priority where feasible (but not by simply increasing the capacity for all traffic).

Comments on North West Leeds Transport Forum Discussion Document Proposals for Hyde Park Corner

Context

- 1.1 I was approached by Bill McKinnon to give a view on the proposals outlined in North West Leeds Transport Forum's (NWLTF) discussion document, dated July 2015, for the junction at Hyde Park Corner (section 5 , page 5 of the discussion document).
- 1.2 Living in Huddersfield, and commuting daily to Leeds by train, I have no interest to declare in any of the proposals or schemes that have previously been proposed or are currently being considered with regards to the A660 Headingley Lane corridor. I have reviewed the proposals in the NWLTF discussion document from the position of an impartial observer.
- 1.3 I have both undergraduate and Masters level qualifications in Computer Science and worked for almost twenty years as a software engineer, during which time I established my own software business developing process control and data analysis applications. I subsequently retrained as a transport planner, gaining an MSc from The University of Leeds in 2008. I worked for a short time as a consultant at Arup in Leeds, and have also worked for Kirklees Highways service, though not directly in the transportation section. I recently completed a PhD in transportation related discipline, and now work for The University of Leeds.


General Comments

- 2.1 The main objective for all the proposals that have been considered for the A660 Headingley Lane corridor is to influence the individual trip making behaviour by making public transport more attractive relative to car, through:
- increasing the speed of the public transport or decreasing the speed of car trips,
 - removing capacity for private traffic from the network so as to reduce the total number of trips that are possible
 - macro-economic measures through the use of fares subsidies or through vehicle usage charging regimes or by controlling the cost of city centre parking.
- 2.2 The problem inherent in attempting these types of policy intervention along the A660 Headingley Lane corridor and through Hyde Park Corner is that none of these measures (apart from the macro-economic ones) can be effective. The inbound route towards Hyde Park Corner from Headingley is predominately single carriageway with no possibility for converting road-space into bus lanes and hence no easy way of removing capacity for private vehicles. Similarly there is no vacant land around the corridor on which to add a new segregated busway. Furthermore there are no obvious alternative routes into the city from Headingley onto which buses could be rerouted. In short, barring major redevelopment along the length of this radial route, cars and buses will continue to share the single carriageway, meaning that the prevailing speed for buses and cars along this stretch of road will remain largely equivalent. Therefore the only way to attain a time advantage for bus trips is through attention to the junctions along the route, including Hyde Park Corner.


- 2.3 The current vehicle turning counts, taken from NGT planning document APP-6-3-3 (page 22, do nothing case) demonstrate the level of vehicle usage at this junction, with over 1,000 inbound PCUs (a private car = 1 PCU) approaching the junction from Headingley Lane in the AM peak. These movements are in conflict with 600 PCUs across the junction from both Hyde Park Road and Woodhouse Street.
- 2.4 Assuming an inbound bus service frequency of 2 minutes (30 buses per hour), this is equivalent to 60 PCUs (1 bus = 2 PCUs, NGT APP-6-3-1, page 2) meaning that on average for every one inbound bus there will be 16 inbound cars crossing the junction.
- 2.5 NWLTF's proposal for Hyde Park Corner involves a ban on right turns at this junction. Since there is no segregation of cars and buses along Headingley Lane or on the approaches to the junction this will affect cars and buses equally.
- 2.6 The effect of banning right turns will increase the capacity for traffic passing through the junction, and whilst this will certainly improve bus trip times, the same increase will also be experienced by private vehicles using the junction. Far from discouraging private cars from using this corridor, given that there is suppressed peak time demand for trips into Leeds, it is likely that the capacity increase attained through the ban on right turns will encourage more inbound commuters to use Headingley Lane.

Detailed Comments on the proposal for Hyde Park Corner

- 3.1 The current vehicle turning counts, taken from NGT planning document APP-6-3-3 (page 22, do nothing case) can be used to demonstrate the effect of the NWLTF's proposal for Hyde Park Corner.
- 3.2 The reassigned turning counts after the implementation of the NWLTF proposal in the AM peak are shown below:



3.3 The reassigned turning counts after the implementation of the NWLTF proposal in the PM peak are shown below:



3.4 The creation of a one-way link from Woodhouse Lane to Hyde Park Road is more than simply “remodelling Moor View” as implied in the discussion document. The original alignment of Moor View appears to have been tight to the buildings fronting onto Woodhouse Lane and the creation of this link would require a new access to be built across an existing car park, the removal of some trees and the likely demolition of at least one building (old toilet block?). It would also change the character of Moor View, which faces directly onto the park, from quiet backwater cul-de-sac to through route with 357 AM/297 PM peak-time PCUs.

3.5 The cumulative effect of banning right turns at Hyde Park Corner junction implies a considerable increase in right turning traffic from Cliff Road onto Woodhouse Lane (+538 AM/+462 PM peak-time PCUs). As this is a priority junction, the traffic would be

required to cross the southbound Woodhouse Lane flow (831 AM/620 PM PCUs) and find free space within the northbound Woodhouse Lane flow (681 AM /850 PM PCUs). Whilst some gaps in the southbound flow might be created by both the phasing of the traffic signals at Hyde Park Corner and the proposed pedestrian crossing on Woodhouse Lane between Cliff Road and Moor View, gaps in the northbound flow would be more difficult to achieve. Furthermore the proposed pedestrian crossing on Woodhouse Lane between Cliff Road and Moor View would disrupt and block the traffic turning right from Cliff Road whenever the crossing was being used by pedestrians. This volume of traffic implies that the junction of Cliff Road and Woodhouse Lane would also need to be signalised.

- 3.6 “Moving the northbound bus stop to a site just north of Hyde Park Road” would require pedestrians to cross both Moor View (357 AM/297 PM PCUs) and Hyde Park Road (211 AM/245 PM PCUs) and whilst pedestrian crossing facilities are provided on Hyde Park Road no such facilities are planned for Moor View although vehicle flows will be greater.
- 3.7 The phasing of “a new pedestrian crossing just north of Victoria Road” would need to be coordinated with the traffic signals at Hyde Park Corner to provide a platoon of southbound vehicles across the junction and to prevent northbound vehicles from tailing back onto the junction.
- 3.8 The creation of a northbound bus lane “on Woodhouse Lane right up to Victoria Road” is problematic for two reasons. Firstly at the junction of Woodhouse Lane and Moor View left turning traffic (357 AM/297 PM PCUs) would be required to turn in front of any buses using the dedicated bus lane. This implies that a northbound bus lane between Cliff Road and Moor View is unlikely. Secondly, after Hyde Park Corner, the northbound carriageway is currently not wide enough (5.15m to the median) to accommodate two northbound lanes and would require the road to be widened and the footway and one lamp column to be moved with space being taken from the greenspace in front of the advertising hoarding on Headingley Lane.
- 3.9 “Creating a stretch of southbound bus lane on the A660 from Woodhouse Street to Cliff Road” would provide little advantage to buses given that vehicles flowing into this section would be fed from a single mixed lane of buses and cars, and that because after Cliff Road the carriageway would revert again to two mixed lanes. The bus lane would however provide a slight advantage to the car flow in that this would not be disrupted when buses stopped at the southbound bus stop on Woodhouse Lane prior to Cliff Road.
- 3.10 The phasing of the traffic signals at Hyde Park Corner suggests a dedicated N to S and S to N stage followed by a late starting left turn stage onto Woodhouse Street. However, the length of the two narrow lanes at the head of the A660 (south) is limited to 43 metres, with capacity for approximately 6-8 cars in each lane. Given that around 25% of all vehicles will be turning left (23% AM/ 26% PM) the duration of the ahead only stage might need to be limited to prevent left turning vehicles queuing back into the single lane section. The short duration of the first stage may prevent a pedestrian phase being included on the Woodhouse Street leg of the junction. Currently the two lanes approaching the junction on Headingley Lane are relatively narrow at 2.75 metres, meaning that it will be difficult and potentially dangerous for both cars and cyclists to share the same lane (particularly for straight ahead traffic).

- 3.11 The scheme “would give pedestrians more opportunity to cross the A660 (without having to pause on the central reservation) and Hyde Park Road and Woodhouse Street”. The selective banning of turning movements at junctions allows pedestrians to be given greater priority, as in this proposal.
- 3.12 The scheme would “allow for much wider pavements”. This is certainly true on Woodhouse Street, although to an extent the same effect could be achieved by simply banning left turns from Woodhouse Street into Woodhouse Lane, with these trips diverted down Cliff Road. This would allow the triangular island at the corner of Woodhouse Street and Woodhouse Lane to be reconnected to the main footway. However, in other places the footway space could come under pressure, particularly on Moor View and on the A660 between Hyde Park Corner and Victoria Road where an additional bus lane is proposed.
- 3.13 The scheme would “reduce delays for buses”. In a footnote the document acknowledges that delays would be reduced for all vehicles, suggesting that none of the changes proposed for this junction would make public transport more attractive relative to cars, both modes would be affected equally, meaning the overall effect of the proposal for this junction is likely to increase the demand for car trips given the additional capacity released by the changes. The document does acknowledge that bus priority measures elsewhere on the network would ensure that this unfortunate situation would not occur, but a discussion of these changes are outside the scope of this commentary.

Summary

- 4.1 The road geometry and available space at and around Hyde Park Corner means it is not possible to easily segregate car and bus flows, making a workable solution to the issues encountered by users of this junction very difficult to find.
- 4.2 This NWLTF proposal attempts to address the congestion at Hyde Park Corner by banning right turns across the junction. However, the proposal does nothing to increase the attractiveness of bus trips relative to car trips, nor does it reduce the road capacity available for car trips through the junction. Indeed the proposal increases capacity for both cars and buses equally, and in all probability given there is a suppressed demand for road trips into Leeds might contribute to making the overall situation worse, by attracting more cars to this junction and consuming the new capacity released by the changes.
- 4.3 The proposal for Hyde Park Corner is presented by NWLTF as a “modest but nonetheless valuable improvement” (page 2). However, as identified in this document, there are a number of technical issues related to this plan which mean that it is likely to be more difficult and more contentious to implement than is implied in the proposal document. A new section of road would need to be built, other sections widened or narrowed and further junction signalisation would be required.
- 4.4 Overall this proposal represents a classical engineering led approach to a traffic problem. However, it does nothing to alter the balance of capacity allocated between cars and buses, and hence it would be unlikely to solve the long standing traffic issues present at this junction.

Andrew Mark Tomlinson, 26th September 2015

NWLTF PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO THE INSPECTOR'S REPORT

NWLTF proposal for a Headingley Bypass for cyclists

- 1 This was also a feature of the trolleybus scheme. The inspector said, *"The proposed design would do very little to make the route more attractive for cyclists, on what is claimed to be the most widely used route by cyclists into Leeds city centre."*

NWLTF proposal to move the wall back along Headingley Lane to widen the road

- 2 The inspector said, *"harm would be caused to the character and appearance of the conservation areas due to the . . . widening of carriageways."*
- 3 The inspector also said, *"quality of life" would be "harmed" by "widening of the roads."*
- 4 The heritage inspector said, *"A number of the LBC applications refer to the 'relocation' and re-instatement' of a listed building. In my judgment, if a listed building is taken down and rebuilt, even if all the original material is re-used, there will be substantial harm to the heritage asset and its setting will have been significantly altered. In such cases, the impact, according to the methodology employed by the ES Heritage chapter, is likely to result in a high level of harm."*
- 5 The heritage inspector also said, *"I would consider the impact to be 'moderate adverse' in respect of the setting of the listed building and 'significant adverse' in respect of the loss of significance of the curtilage listed wall. It is recommended that LBC should only be granted if the public benefits of the NGT Scheme are shown to outweigh this harm."*
- 6 NWLTF state that the advantage of a wider road is that it would enable a bus lane to be provided. The heritage inspector said, *"The mitigation proposed is said to be 'Enhanced opportunities for bus lanes and increased road safety for cyclists. Further opportunities to mitigate against loss in other areas of NGT' and that this would result in a 'slight adverse' impact. This, to me, does not directly address the harm that would be caused to the character and appearance of the conservation area in this location and I consider that this would remain as a 'moderate adverse' impact. It is recommended that CAC should only be granted if the public benefits of the NGT Scheme are found to outweigh this harm."*

NWLTF proposal for a cycle path along Woodhouse Ridge

- 7 The inspector said, *"The scheme conflicts with those UDP policies that seek to protect green spaces, heritage assets, the character and appearance of conservation areas and biodiversity."*

NWLTF proposal for a new road across Woodhouse Moor linking Woodhouse Lane to Hyde Park Road.

- 8 The proposal provides no mitigation for the effect of the new road on the park or the consequent loss of the car park. The inspector said, *"The mitigation measures that have been proposed to compensate for the loss of open space, particularly at Woodhouse Moor and Belle Isle Circus, would not replace the areas that would be taken by the scheme or address the impact of the trolley vehicles on the remaining open space."*
- 9 The inspector said, *"The assessment in the Environment Statement of the effect of the scheme on the character and appearance of Woodhouse Moor does not appear to take account of its location within a conservation area."*

NWLTF proposal to ban right turns all along the route and close roads in order to improve traffic flow

- 10 According to the inspector, *"With regard to closing, diverting or altering the layout of the streets, as detailed in Schedules 3, 4 and 5 to the draft Order, I am satisfied that alternatives would not be required. The closure of Weetwood Lane is the most controversial. This, and other alterations, diversions and closures, could adversely affect the route and timetable of bus services that cross or join the NGT corridor, as well as residents and school children due to dwellings, residential homes and schools being on side roads that could experience increased traffic as a result of 'rat running'. They would also lead to access to properties being made more difficult with longer and more complicated journeys, including those near to the junction of Otley Old Road with Otley Road from where right turns would be restricted."*
- 11 One of the reasons given by the inspector for recommending rejection of the trolleybus was, *"There would also be some parts of the route where the safety and convenience of other road users, including bus users, cyclists and pedestrians, would be likely to be compromised, and I am concerned that the modelling that has been used is not able to accurately forecast the full extent of any likely harm."*
- 12 Another reason the inspector gave was that *"some of the proposed junction designs and road layouts would result in them being more complicated for cyclists and pedestrians to negotiate."*
- 13 Another reason the inspector gave was, *"There would be inconvenience caused by the need for a significant volume of local traffic to take longer routes to reach their destination due to the banning of turns and the closure of roads."*
- 14 The inspector also said, *"The impact of the scheme on overall air quality, including carbon emissions, would be negative, due to the impact on other traffic."*

NWLTF proposal for a park and ride at Bodington

- 15 The inspector said, *"I am not convinced that the predicted use of the park and ride sites has been accurately modelled. This is because its use is difficult to model, given the past use of other park and ride sites, the capacity of the parking that would be provided, and the attractiveness of the sites to motorists. It would also be dependent upon the cost of the fares, which has not been set, and the amount and cost of city centre parking, which are difficult to control."*
- 16 The inspector also said, *"The estimated demand for the proposed park and ride sites has been derived from existing rail park and ride sites at Pudsey and Garforth. As such, the demand for the sites appears to have been overestimated."*

NWLTF proposal for more pedestrian crossings

- 17 The inspector said, *"The promoters have suggested that the scheme would benefit pedestrians by providing a greater number of formal signalised crossings across the route than at present and would make improvements to some footways. However, the additional pedestrian crossings would be necessary to control pedestrians crossing the trolleybus route in order to give priority to the trolleybuses. Delays to pedestrians, especially children, at these signals could frustrate them, leading to them crossing at other locations and resulting in a risk to their safety."*

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Report of the Head of Governance Services and Scrutiny Support

Report to Scrutiny Board (City Development)

Date: 23 November 2016

Subject: Work Schedule

Are specific electoral Wards affected? If relevant, name(s) of Ward(s):	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Are there implications for equality and diversity and cohesion and integration?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Is the decision eligible for Call-In?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
Does the report contain confidential or exempt information? If relevant, Access to Information Procedure Rule number: Appendix number:	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No

1 Purpose of this report

1.1 The purpose of this report is to consider the Scrutiny Board's work schedule for the forthcoming municipal year.

2 Main Issues

2.1 A draft work schedule is attached as appendix 1. The work programme has been provisionally completed pending on going discussions with the Board.

2.2 When considering the draft work programme effort should be undertaken to:

- Avoid duplication by having a full appreciation of any existing forums already having oversight of, or monitoring a particular issue
- Ensure any Scrutiny undertaken has clarity and focus of purpose and will add value and can be delivered within an agreed time frame.
- Avoid pure "information items" except where that information is being received as part of a policy/scrutiny review
- Seek advice about available resources and relevant timings taking into consideration the workload across the Scrutiny Boards and the type of Scrutiny taking place
- Build in sufficient flexibility to enable the consideration of urgent matters that may arise during the year

2.3 Also attached as appendix 2 is the minutes of Executive Board for 19 October 2016

3. Recommendations

3.1 Members are asked to:

- a) Consider the draft work schedule and make amendments as appropriate.
- b) Note the Executive Board minutes

4. **Background papers**¹ - None used

¹ The background documents listed in this section are available to download from the Council's website, unless they contain confidential or exempt information. The list of background documents does not include published works.

Draft Scrutiny Board (City Development) Work Schedule for 2016/2017 Municipal Year

Schedule of meetings/visits during 2016/17

Area of review	June	July	August
Inquiries		Formal Response – Powering Up The Leeds Economy Through Digital Inclusion Formal Response – Housing Mix Transport for Leeds - Scoping	
Annual work programme setting - Board initiated pieces of Scrutiny work (if applicable)	Consider potential areas of review		
Budget			
Pre Decision Scrutiny			
Policy Review			
Recommendation Tracking			
Performance Monitoring	Performance Report		
Working Groups			

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*Prepared by S Pentelow

Key: SB – Scrutiny Board (City Development) Meeting

WG – Working Group Meeting

Draft Scrutiny Board (City Development) Work Schedule for 2016/2017 Municipal Year

Schedule of meetings/visits during 2015/16

Area of review	September	October	November
Inquiries	<p>Agree scope of review for ** Transport for Leeds - Supertram, NGT and beyond</p> <p>Evidence Gathering 1) Transport for Leeds - Supertram, NGT and beyond</p>	<p>Evidence Gathering Bus Provision Inquiry - Inquiry Final Session</p>	<p>Evidence Gathering 2) Transport for Leeds - Supertram, NGT and beyond</p>
Pre Decision Scrutiny			
Policy Review			
Recommendation Tracking			
Performance Monitoring		KSI/ Road Safety - review	
Working Groups			

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* Prepared by S Pentelow

Draft Scrutiny Board (City Development) Work Schedule for 2016/2017 Municipal Year

Schedule of meetings/visits during 2015/16			
Area of review	December	January	February
Inquiries	<p>Reports Bus Inquiry – Pre-meeting discussion on recommendations</p>	<p>Evidence Gathering Transport for Leeds - Supertram, NGT and beyond</p> <p>Reports Bus Inquiry – Final Report</p>	<p>Evidence Gathering Transport for Leeds - Supertram, NGT and beyond</p>
Budget and Policy Framework	<p>Initial Budget Proposals 2017/18 and Budget Update</p> <p>Site Allocation Plan (Re-scheduled from January per Cllr Truswell)</p>		
Pre Decision Scrutiny			
Policy Review			
Recommendation Tracking			Digital Inclusion Housing Mix
Performance Monitoring	<p>Performance Report</p> <p>Draft Best Council Plan</p>		
Working Groups			

Draft Scrutiny Board (City Development) Work Schedule for 2016/2017 Municipal Year

Schedule of meetings/visits during 2015/16			
Area of review	March	April	May
Inquiries	Reports NGT - Pre-meeting discussion on recommendations	Reports NGT Final Report	
Budget and Policy Framework	Local Flood Risk Management Strategy Annual scrutiny review		
Pre Decision Scrutiny			
Recommendation Tracking			
Performance Monitoring			
Working Groups			

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Unscheduled -

- ECOC and the new city cultural strategy –. Pre-decision Scrutiny required in 2016 new municipal year before submission
- Vision for Leisure Centres - @ Executive Board December 2016
- Leeds Let's Get Active
- Housing on Brownfield Land – 5 year land supply - TBC
- East Leeds Extension and Orbital Road Progress - TBC

Updated –November 2016 *Prepared by S Pentelow

Key: SB – Scrutiny Board (City Development) Meeting

WG – Working Group Meeting

EXECUTIVE BOARD

WEDNESDAY, 19TH OCTOBER, 2016

PRESENT: Councillor J Blake in the Chair

Councillors A Carter, R Charlwood,
D Coupar, S Golton, J Lewis, R Lewis,
L Mulherin, M Rafique and L Yeadon

79 Exempt Information - Possible Exclusion of the Press and Public
RESOLVED – That, in accordance with Regulation 4 of The Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, the public be excluded from the meeting during consideration of the following parts of the agenda designated as exempt on the grounds that it is likely, in view of the nature of the business to be transacted or the nature of the proceedings, that if members of the public were present there would be disclosure to them of exempt information so designated as follows:-

- (a) Appendix 1 to the report entitled, 'Vine: Proposal to Transfer to Leeds City College', referred to in Minute No. 94 is designated as exempt from publication in accordance with paragraph 10.4(3) of Schedule 12A(3) of the Local Government Act 1972 on the grounds that it relates to the financial or business affairs of particular persons, or organisations, and of the Council. This information is not publicly available from the statutory registers of information kept in respect of certain companies and charities. It is considered that since this information is to be used as part of one to one negotiations in respect of the leases of these properties in this report, it is not in the public interest to disclose this information at this point in time. Also it is considered that the release of such information would, or would be likely to prejudice Leeds City Council's commercial interests in relation to other similar transactions of other similar properties.

80 Late Items

With the agreement of the Chair, a late item of business was admitted to the agenda entitled, 'Outcome of the Call In of the Decision taken at Executive Board on 21st September 2016 in relation to the 'Better Lives Programme: Phase Three: Next Steps and Progress Report'. This report had been submitted as a late item of business, as this matter, originally considered by Executive Board on 21st September 2016, had been the subject of the Call In procedure, and as such was considered by the Scrutiny Board (Adult Social Services, Public Health & NHS) on 11th October 2016, which resolved to refer the matter back to Executive Board for reconsideration. The Scrutiny report detailing the outcomes of that Call In meeting was circulated on the 14th October 2016, as required. Given the statutory requirement to publish the Executive Board agenda by the 11th October 2016, there was not the opportunity to include such matters in the published agenda. However, the

Draft minutes to be approved at the meeting
to be held on Wednesday, 16th November, 2016

Council's Executive & Decision Making Procedure Rules require that where a Scrutiny Board resolves that a decision is to be referred back to the decision taker for reconsideration, where this is the Executive Board, the report is to be submitted to the next meeting of the Executive Board. As such, with the agreement of the Chair, the matter was submitted for consideration as a late item of business (Minute No. 83 refers).

In addition, and also with the agreement of the Chair, prior to the meeting, Board Members were provided with an updated version of paragraph 4.5.4 to agenda item 16 (Vine – Proposal to Transfer to Leeds City College) for their consideration (Minute No. 94 refers).

81 Declaration of Disclosable Pecuniary Interests

There were no Disclosable Pecuniary Interests declared at the meeting, however, in relation to the agenda item entitled, 'Sustainability and Development of Cultural Organisations in New Briggate', Councillor Yeadon drew the Board's attention to her position as a member of the Leeds Grand Theatre Board and Opera House Board of Management (Minute No. 85 refers).

82 Minutes

RESOLVED – That the minutes of the previous meeting held on 21st September 2016 be approved as a correct record.

HEALTH, WELLBEING AND ADULTS

83 Outcome of the Call In of the Decision taken at Executive Board on 21st September 2016 in relation to the 'Better Lives Programme: Phase Three: Next Steps and Progress Report

Further to Minute No. 60, 21st September 2016, the Director of Adult Social Services submitted a report which presented the outcome of the Scrutiny Board (Adult Social Services, Public Health & NHS) Call In meeting held on 11th October 2016, and which addressed the recommendations made by the Scrutiny Board in its statement when referring the matter back to Executive Board for reconsideration. Finally, Executive Board was invited to further consider those decisions taken on 21st September 2016, in light of the recommendations made by the Scrutiny Board.

For those reasons set out within the submitted report, and as detailed at Minute No. 80, the Chair agreed for this matter to be considered as a late item of business.

The Board paid tribute to the extensive and detailed consideration that the matter had been given by the Scrutiny Board on 11th October 2016.

In presenting the report, the Executive Member undertook to work with any individuals and families who were affected by any actions taken as a result of the decisions made by the Board on this matter.

Responding to a specific enquiry, the Board received an update with regard to the current position in respect of the Manorfield House site. With regard to the current 9 residents at Manorfield House, the Board was assured that they would be guaranteed to receive a level of provision which was at least equal in quality, if not better, to the standard of their current provision, with the caveat that should an individual or the family of that individual choose provision that was rated less than their current standard, then where appropriate, checks may be duly undertaken in order to ensure that that choice was in the individual's best interest. In addition, the Board also received assurances regarding the due regard which had been given to the equality impact procedures in respect of Manorfield House.

Also responding to an enquiry, Members received clarification regarding the occupancy numbers in respect of the Radcliffe Lane Day Centre, and that, as appropriate, further information would be provided to the Member in question in response to the enquiry raised.

With regard to The Green, responding to a Member's enquiries, the Board noted that the intention was to utilise the facility for immediate care / recovery beds, subject to further discussion and agreement with NHS commissioners. However, if such agreement was not reached and the new facility was not progressed, then the current facility would need to be closed. Also, it was confirmed that should this circumstance arise, a further report would be submitted to the Board on this matter, and that in any event, the Board would be kept up to date on the progress of these issues.

It was confirmed that with the agreement of Group Whips, the ordering of the business at the 9th November 2016 Council meeting would be amended in order to facilitate Member comment upon this matter.

In discussing the provision of adult social care in the city, together with the role of the Council and other providers, emphasis was placed upon the importance of ensuring that older people in the city had access to good quality adult social care provision, with the role and involvement of Elected Members being highlighted. Emphasis was also placed upon the importance of the relationship between Elected Members and the Adult Safeguarding Board in terms of safeguarding the welfare of older vulnerable citizens.

In conclusion, the Chair reiterated the importance of continuing to highlight the level of resource that the Local Authority needed in order to ensure that there were the necessary levels of social care provision for older people in the city.

RESOLVED –

- (a) That the Scrutiny Board's recommendations, as detailed at 3.2.1 to 3.2.6 of the submitted report, be accepted, subject to the additional comments in relation to The Green, as per resolution (b) below;
- (b) That the original decisions taken by the Executive Board on 21st September 2016, be re-affirmed, subject to The Green being retained until there can be a seamless transition to the new facility, with it being

noted that the establishment of that new facility is subject to agreement with NHS commissioners, and it also be noted that if such agreement was not reached and the new facility was not progressed, then the current facility would need to be closed;

- (c) That it be noted that a further report will be submitted to Executive Board in order to update the Board on the transition of The Green to the new facility;
- (d) That it be noted and highlighted that the input of the Scrutiny Board is appreciated, and that it also be noted that the Scrutiny Board will be kept informed in order to enable it to monitor the progress made against any decisions taken.

(Under the provisions of Council Procedure Rule 16.5, Councillor A Carter required it to be recorded that he abstained from voting on the decision to re-affirm the resolutions made on 21st September 2016 as referred to within this minute, whilst under the same provisions, Councillor Golton required it to be recorded that he voted against the decision to re-affirm the resolutions made on 21st September 2016 as referred to within this minute)

(In accordance with the Council's Executive and Decision Making Procedure Rules, the matters referred to within this minute were not eligible for Call In, as the power to Call In decisions does not extend to those decisions which have been the subject of a previous Call In. The Executive's decisions in respect of such matters were originally taken by the Board on 21st September 2016 (Minute No. 60 refers) and subsequently Called In. The Scrutiny Board (Adult Social Services, Public Health & NHS) considered the Call In on 11th October 2016 and referred the matter back to the decision taker for reconsideration, with those decisions being further considered by Executive Board at today's meeting (19th October 2016)

ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY

84 Parks and Countryside Attractions Development Plan

The Director of Environment and Housing submitted a report which sought support to the principle of continuing the process of improving attractions at Tropical World, Home Farm and Lotherton Hall Bird Garden. In addition, the report also highlighted the discussions which had taken place regarding the potential to develop an aerial adventure course within Roundhay Park.

Members highlighted the improved offer that the proposals would deliver, and noted how investment in such visitor attractions was able to act as a catalyst for growth in income, and as such making the facilities more sustainable.

In considering the proposals, Members discussed matters including associated consultation exercises, accessibility to the facilities, whilst in response to an enquiry, it was noted that the provision of parking facilities at the three sites would be taken into consideration when progressing the proposals.

RESOLVED –

- (a) That the principle of incurring expenditure to an estimated value of £3.1m in order to deliver the improvements to attractions which are outlined in the submitted report be approved, and that each phase of development at each site be subject to separate approvals, once detailed design and cost estimates are in place;
- (b) That the Chief Officer Parks and Countryside be requested:
 - (i) To implement proposals outlined in the submitted report that will continue the themed development of the visitor attraction elements of the Arnold and Marjorie Ziff Tropical World;
 - (ii) To enter into an agreement with 'Go Ape' regarding the establishment of an aerial adventure concession within Roundhay Park and to support the development of a detailed design from which planning consent is to be sought;
 - (iii) To develop plans and gain any necessary consent that may be required in order to implement the proposals outlined in the submitted report relating to the development of Lotherton Hall Bird Garden; and
 - (iv) To develop plans and gain any necessary consent that may be required in order to implement the proposals outlined in the submitted report relating to the development of Home Farm Temple Newsam.

ECONOMY AND CULTURE

85 Sustainability and Development of Cultural Organisations on New Briggate

Further to Minute No. 25, 22nd June 2016, the Director of City Development submitted a report which provided an update on the issues and opportunities regarding the regeneration of the area around New Briggate. In addition, the report also identified current proposals, and detailed the actions being taken by the Council and other stakeholders to re-energise the area.

Responding to an enquiry, Members were assured that the proposal to lease 34-40 New Briggate would be subject to support for the scheme being obtained from The Grand Theatre and Opera House Board, and also subject to a successful application for Arts Council funding being received, and if such funding was not obtained, then the matter would be resubmitted to the Executive Board for further consideration.

Members also highlighted the importance of ensuring that any wider proposals for regeneration in this area were of benefit to the whole of the city and were complimentary to those buildings which were key to Leeds' cultural offer, such as the Grand Theatre.

RESOLVED –

- (a) That the leasing of 34-40 New Briggate to Opera North Ltd. at market rent be approved, subject to support for the scheme from The Grand

Theatre and Opera House Board, a successful application for Arts Council funding and also the required planning approval;

- (b) That the agreement of the detailed terms for the disposal be delegated to the Director of City Development under delegated powers, with the matter being reported back to Executive Board;
- (c) That it be noted that the £750,000 currently in the capital programme to finance a reverse premium will no longer be required to fund landlord improvements at 34-40 New Briggate, and instead it is proposed that this funding contributes towards complementary public realm improvements as part of the wider regeneration of the New Briggate area, as outlined within Section 3.2 of the submitted report;
- (d) That officers reporting to the Director City Development be requested to continue partnership working in order to develop more detailed design of the public realm and the funding options to implement public realm improvements.

86 Storm Eva: Recovery Update

Further to Minute No. 21, 22nd June 2016, the Assistant Chief Executive (Citizens and Communities) submitted a report providing an update on the impact of Storm Eva in Leeds, specifically with respect to the recovery plan, lessons learned, flood alleviation proposals for the city and the support provided to those businesses and residents affected.

The Chair highlighted a cross-party delegation which had met with Therese Coffey MP, and also reiterated the importance of continuing to highlight to Government the need to ensure that Leeds received the required support in order to establish appropriate flood alleviation and defence mechanisms.

Responding to an enquiry, the Board received further information and clarification on the levels of take up in respect of the Community Support Scheme and also the Property Level Resilience Scheme.

Members also received an update regarding the actions being taken, in partnership with the Environment Agency, to clean up the River Aire.

Responding to an enquiry, officers undertook to provide Board Members with an update in respect of the work being undertaken around the compilation of riparian land ownership details in respect of the River Aire.

In conclusion, Members welcomed the regular updates that the Board had received on such matters since the events of Storm Eva in December 2015, and welcomed the submission of any further updates in the future, as and when appropriate.

RESOLVED –

- (a) That the updates detailed within the submitted report, including the details regarding the progress of the Strategic Recovery Plan, be noted;
- (b) That the progress regarding the recommendations from the lessons learned review, be noted;
- (c) That support be provided for the decision to formally close the Council's recovery phase of work and for remaining issues to now be allocated to 'business as usual' projects and programmes, or service delivery;
- (d) That approval be given for the additional Communities and Business Recovery Scheme initiative of £100,000 for phase two of the River Aire clean-up activity, subject to the Director of City Development consulting with the Local Enterprise Partnership;
- (e) That approval be given for the additional Communities and Business Recovery Scheme initiative of £150,000 to introduce a business growth scheme specifically to support Business Growth projects in affected areas, subject to the Director of City Development consulting with the Local Enterprise Partnership.

EMPLOYMENT, SKILLS AND OPPORTUNITY

87 The Leeds Adult Learning Programme

The Director of Children's Services submitted a report which outlined the delivery plans for the Council's Adult Learning programme for the 2016/17 academic year and which also summarised the achievements to date. The report presented the potential future changes as part of the proposals to devolve the Adult Education Budget to local areas and detailed the planned work to respond to this which would look to ensure that all citizens could continue to access provision and achieve positive outcomes.

Responding to a Member's enquiry, the Board received an update on the current position regarding the Government's proposed transfer of control of the Adult Education Budget to the West Yorkshire Combined Authority.

RESOLVED –

- (a) That the current programme offer and its contribution towards the achievement of Council objectives, be noted;
- (b) That the planned approach towards developing a place based approach to adult skills with local stakeholders under the proposed devolved funding arrangements, be supported;
- (c) That it be noted that the responsible officer for the implementation of such matters is the Head of Project and Programmes, Employment and Skills.

RESOURCES AND STRATEGY

88 Financial Health Monitoring 2016/17 - Month 5

The Deputy Chief Executive submitted a report which presented the Council's projected financial health position for 2016/17, as at month 5. The report reviewed the position of the budget and highlighted any potential key risks and variations at this stage of the financial year.

RESOLVED – That the projected financial position of the authority, as detailed within the submitted report, be noted.

89 Payment of a Minimum Hourly Rate of £8.25 to Leeds City Council Employees

Further to Minute No. 50, 23rd September 2015, the Deputy Chief Executive submitted a report which provided an update on the progress made in the past twelve months as the Council worked towards paying a recognised living wage rate. In addition, the report also set out the further work which was proposed in order to support this commitment.

Responding to a Member's enquiry, it was noted that £8.25/hour was the current minimum pay rate as recommended by the National Living Wage Foundation, which was reviewed on an annual basis.

RESOLVED –

- (a) That the progress made in addressing low pay and in-work poverty issues amongst the workforce regionally, in response to signing the Low Pay Charter, be noted, and that it also be noted that whilst the Council is not an accredited Living Wage Employer, it is committed to the West Yorkshire Low Pay Charter and the Ethical Care Charter;
- (b) That the work that the Council is undertaking, as detailed within the submitted report, be noted, and that the Board's agreement be given to increasing the minimum hourly rate to £8.25 from January 2017, which is the current Living Wage Foundation recommended rate. It also be noted that this minimum rate of pay is inclusive of any pay award which is applied in April 2017 and in the instance where the pay award exceeds the minimum proposed rate of £8.25, then the higher amount of the two will be paid. It also be noted that such matters will be implemented by the Deputy Chief Executive;
- (c) That the Board's agreement be given to the Council continuing to engage suppliers, partners and the business community in Leeds in order to help tackle the wider issues of poverty in the city and develop projects to build a stronger local economy and compassionate city, which will reflect commitments made in the West Yorkshire Low Pay Charter and integrate with Breakthrough Projects.

90 Local Government Association Corporate Peer Challenge: Findings and Initial Response

The Deputy Chief Executive submitted a report which presented the findings from the Local Government Association (LGA) Peer Challenge of the Council that took place in July 2016. The report summarised the scope of the Peer Challenge and the approach taken by the review team, provided headline messages, detailed the key resulting recommendations and set out the Council's initial response, together with the further work planned.

Members welcomed the submitted report together with the findings and recommendations arising from the Corporate Peer Challenge. It was highlighted that the recommendations made were very much valued and were being taken into consideration as part of the approach to move the Council forward in line with the Best Council Plan priorities.

In conclusion, the Chief Executive paid tribute to all staff for their contribution towards what was a very positive outcome.

RESOLVED – That the following be noted:-

- (i) The content of the Corporate Peer Challenge feedback report, as appended to the submitted report;
- (ii) The initial assessment of actions and progress being made by the Council against the key recommendations;
- (iii) That further improvement work to use the findings will be delivered through existing initiatives, such as the Best Council Plan 2017/18 refresh, the organisational service reviews including the Locality Review, the annual review of the Constitution and the People and Culture strategy;
- (iv) That the Deputy Chief Executive will be responsible for taking forward the improvement work, and that an update will be submitted to Executive Board in October 2017.

REGENERATION, TRANSPORT AND PLANNING

91 Establishment of the Leeds Tech Hub Fund

Further to Minute No. 50, 27th July 2016, the Director of City Development submitted a report providing an update on the development of proposals for a Tech Hub, and which also proposed the establishment of a Leeds Tech Hub Fund, with the running of an open grant competition in Autumn 2016 in order to determine the most appropriate project(s) to support via the fund. In addition, the report also sought approval to delegate subsequent authority to the Director of City Development with regard to the selection of the winning project(s) and also to enter into any associated funding agreements.

Members welcomed the approach being taken in respect of the open grant competition and also welcomed the involvement of the tech sector in this initiative.

RESOLVED – That in recognising the opportunity that has been provided by the £3.7m Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) grant for a Tech Hub in Leeds:

- (i) Approval be given to the establishment of a Leeds Tech Hub Fund;
- (ii) The necessary authority be delegated to the Director of City Development in order to run an open competition for the allocation of the Leeds Tech Hub Fund, together with the selection of the successful project(s) to be supported via the Fund;
- (iii) The decisions being made in line with the resolutions above be supported via input from the tech sector, through input from the Leeds Digital Board.

HEALTH, WELLBEING AND ADULTS

92 The Director of Public Health Annual Report 2016

The Director of Public Health submitted a report which presented a summary of the background to, and content of the Director of Public Health's 2016 Annual Report entitled, "1866-2016: 150 Years of Public Health in Leeds – A Story of Continuing Challenges".

Responding to a Member's enquiry, the Board received an update on the progress being made in respect of developers following the principles set out in the *Neighbourhood for Living* document and using the Director's 2015 Annual Report as a guide on the public health benefits of good design.

In addition, Members also discussed, and received an update on the actions being taken to address the issue of stress and anxiety being experienced by young people.

RESOLVED –

- (a) That the availability of the following be noted:-
 - (i) This year's digital Annual Report at www.leeds.gov.uk/dphreport;
 - (ii) The digital materials on 150 years of Public Health in Leeds;
 - (iii) Indicators on the current health status for the Leeds population;
- (b) That the inclusion of improving health status as a specific objective within the new Council approach to locality working, regeneration and the Breakthrough projects as a contribution towards the delivery of the Health & Wellbeing Strategy and the Best Council Plan, be supported;
- (c) That it be recommended that the Health & Wellbeing Board ensures that improving health status is a specific objective within the development of New Models of Care being led by the NHS as a contribution towards the delivery of the Health & Wellbeing Strategy;
- (d) That the progress made on the recommendations of the Director of Public Health Annual Report 2014/15 be noted.

CHILDREN AND FAMILIES

93 Outcome of School Admission Arrangements 2016

The Director of Children's Services submitted a report presenting statistical information on the annual school admissions round for entry into Reception and Year 7 for September 2016.

Officers responded to comments made regarding the provision of school places available in the North East of the city.

RESOLVED – That the following be noted, as detailed within the submitted report:-

- (i) The number of applications for both phases of education; the percentage of successful first preferences for Secondary admissions being 82.4%; and for Reception admissions the figure being 87%;
- (ii) The percentage of parents receiving one of their top three preferences being 95% for Secondary, and 96% for Primary; and
- (iii) That the officer responsible for such matters is the Admissions and Family Information Service Lead.

94 Vine - Proposal to Transfer to Leeds City College

The Director of Children's Services submitted a report which provided information on the current governance situation regarding Vine, outlined the potential options for future governance arrangements and provided recommendations in respect of future arrangements for Members' consideration.

It was noted that prior to the meeting, an updated version of paragraph 4.5.4 of the submitted report had been circulated to Board Members for their consideration which superseded the version of that paragraph, as contained within the original agenda papers.

Following consideration of Appendix 1 to the submitted report, designated as exempt from publication under the provisions of Access to Information Procedure Rule 10.4(3), which was considered in private at the conclusion of the meeting, it was

RESOLVED –

- (a) That the contents of the submitted report be noted, subject to paragraph 4.5.4 being superseded by the updated text as provided to the Board prior to the meeting;
- (b) That the transfer of the Vine Service from Leeds City Council to Leeds City College, be approved;
- (c) That, following the approval given in resolution (b) (above), it be noted that the transfer is scheduled for completion on 1st November 2016;

Draft minutes to be approved at the meeting
to be held on Wednesday, 16th November, 2016

- (d) That it be noted that the officer responsible for the implementation of such matters is the Complex Needs Area Lead West North West – Disability, Children’s Services;
- (e) That approval be given to the granting of a lease, with the approval of detailed terms being delegated to the Director of City Development, at a rental level, as set out within exempt Appendix 1 to the submitted report.

95 Outcome of consultation to increase learning places at Carr Manor Community School

Further to Minute No. 151, 9th March 2016, the Director of Children’s Services submitted a report detailing proposals brought forward to meet the local authority’s duty to ensure sufficiency of both school and Special Educational Needs (SEN) places. Specifically, this report described the outcome of the consultation regarding proposals to expand primary school provision and establish SEN provision at Carr Manor Community School, noted why the proposals had not been progressed previously and sought permission to publish a new statutory notice in respect of such proposals.

RESOLVED –

- (a) That the publication of a Statutory Notice be approved to expand primary provision at Carr Manor Community School from a capacity of 210 pupils to 420 pupils with an increase in the admission number from 30 to 60, with effect from September 2018, and also to establish provision for pupils with Complex Communication Difficulties including children who may have a diagnosis of ASC (Autistic Spectrum Condition) for approximately 12 pupils (6 primary, 6 secondary), with effect from September 2018;
- (b) That it be noted that the officers responsible for the implementation of such matters are the Head of Learning Systems and the Head of Complex Needs.

COMMUNITIES

96 High Rise Strategy

The Director of Environment and Housing submitted a report providing an update regarding the progress made in respect of developing a new approach towards the management of High Rise blocks, and which also set out a number of proposals regarding the future management of such accommodation.

Responding to a Member’s comments, it was undertaken that car parking provision would be taken into consideration when developing the new approach.

Also, in response to a Member's request, officers undertook to provide the Member in question with details of all high rise blocks in the city, and the management model which was being foreseen for each one.

RESOLVED –

- (a) That agreement be given for Housing Leeds to implement the housing management models and approaches, as detailed within section 3.1 of the submitted report – namely: 'Family Friendly'; 'Enhanced Support' and 'Retirement/Retirement plus';
- (b) That the following proposed changes to the lettings framework for high rise be approved, namely:
 - (i) Restrict lettings to applicants with children (and access rights) in high rise blocks which are deemed unsuitable for children;
 - (ii) Restrict lettings to high rise flats for 16 and 17 year olds;
 - (iii) Awarding those families with children who choose to move to family friendly blocks priority to move, flagging them for a direct offer of accommodation and backdating their priority and direct let status to the date of their original acceptance on the housing register should they wish to move, giving them additional preference on the housing register.
- (c) That the Council's approach to developing a 10 year investment strategy for High Rise accommodation, be approved.

DATE OF PUBLICATION: FRIDAY, 21ST OCTOBER 2016

**LAST DATE FOR CALL IN
OF ELIGIBLE DECISIONS:** 5.00 P.M., FRIDAY, 28TH OCTOBER 2016

(Scrutiny Support will notify Directors of any items called in by 12.00 noon on Monday, 31st October 2016)

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